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ABSTRACT
SPECIAL OBLIGATIONS AND EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
Dylan Manson
Kok-Chor Tan

Each paper can be read independently, but the general problem that’s at the focus of this
dissertation is the following. On the one hand, morality and justice appear to impose the
same requirements on all. According to some of the most influential moral and political
theories, what we owe to each other should be informed by ‘impartial’ requirements of
fairness or respect for persons—requirements that apply regardless of whether the people
you interact with happen to be relatives, friends, or members of the same society. Yet
many would balk at the notion that we cannot permissibly favor some—they would
charge that these sorts of views of morality or justice don’t do justice to the importance of
‘special’ relationships. This dissertation focuses on how we should think about resolving
this tension between requirements, especially when it comes to national or democratic
ties in emergency contexts. The first paper offers a critical analysis of the special
relationship that nationalists claim we hold to co-nationals. The second paper assesses the
limits of this relationship under the emergency conditions provided by the pandemic. The
third investigates our special relationship to democratic society and the limits of action
under the climate emergency.
In ‘Against Cultural Identity as Grounds for the Intrinsic Value of SelfDetermination’ I argue against the liberal nationalist claim that national selfix

determination is intrinsically valuable because it’s grounded in national cultural identity.
In ‘Vaccine Nationalism and Basic Rights’ I argue that the case against COVID-19
vaccine nationalism is robustly overdetermined because it violates duties we have to
uphold a basic subsistence right to health. In ‘Eco-Sabotage as Defensive Activism’ I
argue that we can do justice to our commitments to democratic society and yet still
engage in illegal and coercive property destruction with environmental aims.
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PREFACE

Each paper can be read independently, but the general problem that’s at the focus of this
dissertation is the following. On the one hand, morality and justice appear to impose the
same requirements on all. According to some of the most influential moral and political
theories, what we owe to each other should be informed by ‘impartial’ requirements of
fairness or respect for persons—requirements that apply regardless of whether the people
you interact with happen to be relatives, friends, or members of the same society. Yet
many would balk at the notion that we cannot permissibly favor some—they would
charge that these sorts of views of morality or justice don’t do justice to the importance of
‘special’ relationships. This dissertation focuses on how we should think about resolving
this tension between requirements, especially when it comes to national or democratic
ties in emergency contexts. The first paper offers a critical analysis of the special
relationship that nationalists claim we hold to co-nationals. The second paper assesses the
limits of this relationship under the emergency conditions provided by the pandemic. The
third investigates our special relationship to democratic society and the limits of action
under the climate emergency.
In ‘Against Cultural Identity as Grounds for the Intrinsic Value of SelfDetermination’ I argue against the liberal nationalist claim that national selfdetermination is intrinsically valuable because it’s grounded in national cultural identity.
In ‘Vaccine Nationalism and Basic Rights’ I argue that the case against COVID-19
xiii

vaccine nationalism is robustly overdetermined because it violates duties we have to
uphold a basic subsistence right to health. In ‘Eco-Sabotage as Defensive Activism’ I
argue that we can do justice to our commitments to democratic society and yet still
engage in illegal and coercive property destruction with environmental aims. I’ll provide
more detailed summaries in what follows.

Against Cultural Identity as Grounds for the Intrinsic Value of SelfDetermination

This paper takes David Miller is my primary interlocutor. His life’s work is to defend a
liberal nationalism which argues that there ought to be moral and legal protections for
nations because nations provide us with cultural bonds that are intrinsically valuable.
Liberal individualism is impoverished, in Miller’s view, for the same reasons that a strict
moral impartiality is impoverished if it requires us to treat strangers and our nearest and
dearest alike. We ought to reject a view that would lead to the disintegration of our
relationships to friends, family, and romantic partners, so we ought to reject a view that
fatally undermines our relationships to our co-nationals too.
The intrinsic value of collective self-determination, for Miller, is “…the value of
belonging to a group that can act so as to make a difference to the world in accordance

xiv

with the formed will of its members.”1 He aims to establish this intrinsic value with two
independent arguments. First, he uses an inference to the best explanation argument to
claim that the only explanation for the members of well-functioning democracies to seek
self-determination is because they recognize that self-determination is intrinsically
valuable. Against this, I argue there is a readily available alternative: members of wellfunctioning democracies may see the achievement of collective self-determination as the
best route to achieve their preferred political aims. Entrenched political minorities may
have faced generations of political impotency in a democratic system. If a political
minority is even loosely tied by territory and culture, then it’s easy to see how wellmeaning and nefarious actors alike could exploit this to achieve their political aims by
constitutional change. In the same way that many campaign for legal changes that support
their political agenda, I argue that there’s a straightforward connection between
institutional political impotency and a desire for constitutional change.
Miller’s second argument for the intrinsic value of collective self-determination
claims that it’s intuitively appealing that small interpersonal groups have intrinsically
valuable collective self-determination. One way of understanding the intrinsic value of
autonomy is that we prefer to be able to make our own choices even when we know that
our choices make us worse off. We often think of small-scale interpersonal groups in the
same way: we would prefer that our group is free to make its own decisions even if, as a
member, I think a particular decision the group takes will make me and/or the rest of the
group worse off. Miller argues that nation-states are normatively continuous with

1

David Miller, Is Self-Determination a Dangerous Illusion?, 1st edition (Medford, MA: Polity, 2020). p.36
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interpersonal groups in this regard, so we ought to recognize the intrinsic value of the
collective self-determination of nations too.
This argument hangs on how we ought to conceptualize self-determination.
Jeremy Waldron describes the territorial conception and the identity-based conception.
The former claims that proximity always results in disputes and disputants have interests
in being part authors of fair and equal rules of dispute resolution. The latter claims that a
shared cultural identity across time provides a common reference point to ease conflict,
provides emotional (not just pragmatic) bonds, and increases trust between members.
Miller affirms the identity-based conception. I claim that the identity-based conception
requires, at least some of the time, that nationals value cultural self-determination over
fair and equal procedures of conflict resolution. This is impermissible because it is
objectionably perfectionistic.

Vaccine Nationalism and Basic Rights

The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the strength of nationalist tendencies. It created a
global emergency that required international solidarity and cooperation, but many world
leaders and governments reacted by leveraging any advantage they had to prioritize the
residents of their own territory. Countries clearly showed their nationalist commitments
through how they handled COIVD-19 vaccine distribution, in particular. In this paper, I
xvi

provide an assessment of what makes COVID-19 vaccine nationalism wrong and the
extent to which it is wrong. I do this by giving a lot of ground to nationalists: I assume
the truth of liberal nationalism and make the case that there are more reasons to engage in
vaccine nationalism during the conditions of absolute scarcity in life-saving medical
resources that are created by the pandemic.
Still, permissible nationalism can never happen at the expense of the basic rights
of others. There is much debate over the content of a basic subsistence right. I claim that
part of a basic subsistence right incorporates a basic subsistence right to health. There is
also a lot of debate over which duties may emerge from recognition of such a right.
Instead of taking a stand on this issue, I argue that COVID-19 vaccine nationalism
violates each of the sorts of duties we would normally associate with such a right.
COVID-19 vaccine nationalism violates our positive duties to aid those in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs). Furthermore, failing to discharge our positive duties
toward LMICs violates or negative duty not to needlessly prolong and deepen the
severity of the pandemic. Together these provide very strong reasons against COVID-19
vaccine nationalism. Finally, vaccine nationalism is multiply overdetermined and
protecting against it requires diligence. Even if a country would fully comply with current
international institutions pertaining to vaccine distribution, this is not enough if support
of those institutions tends to burden LMIC’s in ways that focus the benefits on rich
countries.

xvii

Eco-Sabotage as Defensive Activism

Eco-sabotage is always illegal, commonly involves property destruction, and aims to
protect animals or the environment. Moreover, eco-sabotage ought to be illegal, so how
could it ever be justifiable to a democratic society? I draw on the civil disobedience
literature to argue that illegal action can be permissible, and I draw the just war literature
to claim that even coercive civil disobedience can be permissible.
I develop a just war inspired defensive theory that justifies defensive activism
even in the face of some negative outcomes for the environmental movement, while
showing how defensive theories need not lead to rationalizing murder or serious harm to
persons. The conscientious defensive activist can only engage in permissible ecosabotage when she acts with just cause as constrained by necessity, proportionality, with
a reasonable chance of success, without putting life at excessive risk. Permissible ecosabotage must pass stringent conditions, but this is preferable to being unavailable as a
strategy. Extreme situations call for the availability of extreme tactics lest activists be left
impotent in the face of egregious wrongs.
This places a considerable burden on eco-saboteurs to justify their acts. I argue
that there are two, sometimes crosscutting, justificatory standards that acts of ecosabotage must pass to be permissible. The public justification points out that since all acts
of eco-sabotage are illegal, there’s a sense in which they all bypass impartial means of
xviii

conflict resolution. Appropriately constrained eco-sabotage doesn’t bypass societal
norms, however, but takes them into account. I argue that there are at least four forms of
eco-sabotage which can be individuated by the value they seek to defend and that not all
these forms of defense can be publicly justified to democratic society. Eco-sabotage
grounded in defense of animal rights, for instance, fails the public justification because it
is grounded in a private conception of the good. What I call species defense is publicly
justifiable but doesn’t have as strong a case as defense against suffering or defense
against climate change. Defense against climate change has a particularly strong case as it
can be grounded in human rights, which are an undeniable basis for any democratic
society.
The second justificatory standard is that eco-sabotage must also have a reasonable
chance of success since futile defense is no defense at all. This objection has little effect
on eco-sabotage as defense of rights or defense against suffering because they are both
about protecting individuals. It’s easy to determine and obtain the success conditions for
protecting animal rights or stopping animal suffering. Species defense and defense
against climate change, however, are more complicated. How many members of a species
is it necessary to protect if we want to preserve the species? Will stopping any particular
act of pollution do anything to curtail the suffering and death that results from climate
change? I argue that the strength of this objection is reduced by placing the act of ecosabotage in a broader environmental strategy.
Because defense against suffering doesn’t face the full brunt of either objection, it
is perhaps the most justifiable form of eco-sabotage. However, eco-sabotage as defense
xix

against climate change, and to a lesser extent species defense, remain in the conscientious
activist’s repertoire of permissible actions.

xx

Chapter 1: Against Cultural Identity as Grounds for the Intrinsic Value
of Self-Determination

‘All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’ This is
article 1 from two UN documents on human rights.2 When we think of human rights, we think of
individual rights that individual persons enjoy. Individuals face dangers that require special
moral, legal, and political protections. Individuals face dangers from other individuals, but we
commonly think of rights as protections against groups both public and private. Individuals enjoy
an inviolable status that cannot be sacrificed for the pursuit of collective (or any other) ends.
Article 1, above, clearly bestows a right of self-determination to groups, however, not individuals.
Normatively, can we make sense of this?
Intuitively, there are two different directions that a right of self-determination can be
criticized from. On the one hand, there’s the external perspective taken by an actor outside the
group purported to have a collective right of self-determination. They may wonder about the basis
of their exclusion, or why they are being deprived of certain protections others have. On the other
hand, there’s the internal perspective. Members of the group that enjoy a right to collective selfdetermination may see it is a permission to silence their individuality or otherwise use the group
to wrongfully deprive them. In this paper I will concentrate on the value of self-determination
because whether the criticism is internal or external, the defense must involve some reference to
what value is being protected in the first place.3 Maybe it turns out that individuals regardless of

2

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. Quoted from p.1 of Miller.
3
Anna Stilz, ‘The Value of Self-Determination’, in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 2, ed.
David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (Oxford University Press, 2016), 98–127,
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759621.003.0005.
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group membership get priority over a group’s right to self-determination because the demands of
the global needy are so great, but it’s difficult to know this without understanding the value at
stake, if indeed there is a coherent value at stake.4 Most of my discussion will center around
internal criticisms because when discussing a justificatory value for a right that’s supposed to
range over a group, the most pressing objections will come from members of the group who may
reasonably object that this right is valuable to them. Only if the group right can be defended for
its individual members, can we then move to see whether the right remains justified in the face of
external criticisms.
Finally, the most robust defense of a right to collective self-determination won’t rely on it
being merely instrumental to some further ends since this makes it too easily overridden.
Moreover, the most prominent defenders of collective self-determination tend to view it as noninstrumentally valuable. This is certainly how one of the most prominent defenders of collective
self-determination from a liberal nationalist perspective, David Miller, views the value is his
recent book Is Self-Determination a Dangerous Illusion? I will use this book to focus discussion.

1.1: Introducing Miller and the Shape of the Paper

Are political communities valuable? Forming in groups has numerous benefits like security and
efficiency, e.g., but are political communities only valuable in this derivative way? Miller argues

4

Kok-Chor Tan, ‘Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5,
no. 4 (2002): 431–61; Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and
Patriotism (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site,
Ground, and Scope of Equality (Oxford University Press, 2012).

2

that group membership can be intrinsically valuable.5 For him, nations have special status
because they are vehicles for collective self-determination. Nations are groups that are unified
over time via a shared cultural identity.6 It’s valuable, he claims, for nationals to make decisions
together about their collective future. This capacity to make decisions together is not only
valuable for what we gain by it, but it’s valuable in and of itself.7
If collective self-determination is intrinsically valuable, then this would provide special
normative protection for group decisions just for being group decisions. If we decide on
something together, then this provides a presumptive privilege that our choice ought not be
overridden. Minus defeating reasons, we must respect individual autonomy. If Miller is correct,
then the same holds for collective self-determination. This would give special dispensation to
certain groups and normatively reify a distinction between insider and outsider. We can imagine
that this provides a starting point to justify broad ranging group partiality including control over
resources, migration, and – in general – it would provide some resistance against principles or
institutions that range over various nations. Just as, everything else being equal, individuals have
the final say over their life’s course, nations would have the final say over their future too.
In Miller’s Is Self-Determination a Dangerous Illusion?, I see him as offering two
arguments for the intrinsic value of collective self-determination (hereafter ‘self-determination’.
I’ll reserve ‘autonomy’ for ‘individual autonomy’). His first argument is an inference to the best
5

Miller, Is Self-Determination a Dangerous Illusion?, Chapter 2.
Cf. Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press,
1991); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Clarendon Press,
1996); Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001); David Miller, On Nationality, Oxford Political Theory (Oxford : New
York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1995); David Miller, National Responsibility and Global
Justice (Oxford University Press, 2007); Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton University Press,
1995).
7
Compare ‘...as we shall try to show, the right of self-determination so understood is not ultimate, but is
grounded in the wider value of national self-government, which is itself to be only instrumentally justified.’
Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, ‘National Self-Determination’, The Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 9
(1990): 439–61, https://doi.org/10.2307/2026968 p.441.
6

3

explanation. He describes some actual political circumstances that, he argues, can only be
explained if self-determination is intrinsically valuable. I argue to the contrary by showing that
there are other plausible explanations. Second, he describes small, interpersonal groups, where
self-determination seems intrinsically valuable, and argues that there is continuity between them
and large groups like nations. I argue that while Miller may be correct that some large-scale
groups seem to preserve a meaningful continuity to intrinsically valuable self-determining groups
in the way he describes, this is rare because the method of group unity that Miller favors is often
illiberal due to being unjustly exclusionary.
A key component of my argument is to ask how defenders of the intrinsic value of selfdetermination can provide a reasonable justification to entrenched political minorities. Miller
must show that self-determination isn’t merely valuable for what we may gain by its use, but for
its own sake. This amounts to valuing a protected normative status for group decisions even
when, as individuals, we disagree with them. Entrenched political minorities perpetually disagree
with group decisions, so Miller’s task is to explain why entrenched minorities intrinsically value
self-determination despite this supporting their political impotence. This is particularly perplexing
given that collective self-determination is supposed to be an extension of individual autonomy,
yet if an entrenched minority supports self-determination, this seems to undermine their political
agency.
Following Jeremy Waldron, we may recognize two ways to address this problem.8 Either
the entrenched political minority is appeased by the cultural unity they feel with the majority, or
they are appeased by appeal to fair and impartial procedures. Miller favors the former identarian
conception of self-determination. I argue that the identarian view’s only response is to make it the
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state’s business to tell entrenched minority’s what they ought to value. This is unjustly
exclusionary for perfectionistic reasons. Entrenched minorities have good grounds to reject the
intrinsic value of self-determination, and the only recourse the identarian conception can appeal
to is that the minority group doesn’t value the correct things. This isn’t within the remit of a
liberal state. On the other hand, the territorial conception of self-determination can be defended
on the grounds that impartial procedures can be supplemented in order for the voices of
entrenched minorities to be heard.

1.2: First Intrinsic Value Argument

Miller’s first argument for the intrinsic value of self-determination is intuitively appealing. Miller
ascribes to J. S. Mill’s view of intrinsic value.9 That is, the best evidence of something being
intrinsically valuable is that people value it that way. If people seek self-determination for no
other reason than to have self-determination, then this is sufficient reason to think that selfdetermination is intrinsically valuable. Establishing this is no mean feat, however. We need an
example of a group seeking self-determination when there is no ulterior motive other than to
obtain self-determination itself.
What examples of groups seeking self-determination might we look to? The most
obvious example is those who seek freedom from colonial rule, but it’s far from clear that these
groups sought self-determination for its own sake. Colonial rule goes hand-in-hand with
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oppression, subjugation, and injustice. It’s possible that the only reason any of the post-colonial
nations sought self-determination was to be released from the oppression of their colonizer. A
clearer example would be self-determination without freedom from an outside force.
Those nations that sought self-determination during the Arab-Spring were not looking to
get out from underneath another nation. They wanted to throw off stagnant dictatorships and
become self-governing. Here again, however, we might surmise that these groups sought selfdetermination for a different reason: they wanted to establish a democracy. Plausibly, this was not
self-determination for its own sake, but self-determination for governmental change. In a clearer
example, the group seeking self-determination isn’t only doing so to establish democracy.
Hence, Miller looks for examples of groups seeking self-determination where it’s clear
they don’t want freedom from injustice nor wish to establish democracy. He argues that there are
numerous examples with these features because there are various respectfully treated groups
within democracies seeking self-determination. Or, in his words, there are many groups from
within well-functioning democracies seeking self-determination.10 The groups he has in mind are
Catalonians, Flemish, Scottish, and the Quebecois. Since these groups are already treated with
equal respect alongside others in the polity, and they already benefit from democratic rule, it
cannot be that these groups seek self-determination to achieve what they already have. Thus,
Miller argues, there cannot be any other reason that these groups want self-determination other
than for self-determination itself. Recall that we’re following Mill, if people treat something like
it has intrinsic value, then this is good evidence that it has intrinsic value. Millions of people seem
to seek self-determination for its own sake, so we seem to have good evidence that selfdetermination is intrinsically valuable.
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Miller relies on this argument heavily. He uses the example of groups in well-functioning
democracies seeking self-determination multiple times to head off objections, and to motivate his
continued pursuit of the details of the intrinsic value of self-determination.11 One way this
argument is vulnerable is if there are other explanations for why these groups seek selfdetermination. What other explanations are available?
One alternative explanation charges these groups with chauvinistic nationalism.12 That is,
they seek self-determination out of a sense of cultural superiority or purity such that they wish to
rid themselves of the burden of multiculturalism and establish their rightful superiority over other
nations. This would counter Miller’s argument because chauvinistic nationalism is clearly unjust.
More evidence is required, however, if the charge of chauvinistic nationalism is going to stick.
Some nationalisms, for instance, are known to embrace multiculturalism, migrants, and refugees.
Scottish nationalism, e.g., is commonly considered as civic nationalism rather than ethnic
nationalism, and while Scots exclude the audibly English from Scottish identity, Scots welcome
ethnically Pakistani Muslims, for instance, as Scottish.13 The threat of chauvinistic nationalism is
real and liberal nationalists risk emboldening them, but it’s not obvious that liberal nationalism is
a morally incoherent position. It would be too quick to dismiss these movements as necessarily
exclusionary in this way.
Another explanation for why these groups seek self-determination claims that national
groups within well-functioning liberal democracies desire self-determination for narrow political
advantages. Unsurprisingly, even though the self-determination movements at hand seek selfdetermination as independence on cultural grounds, they also have political aims that tend to
11
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differ from the majority group they wish to secede from. After all, if their political aims were
broadly aligned then there would be little reason for constitutional change. Political differences
alone, however, are not good grounds for secession. At least, not unless those political differences
lead to injustice.14 Disagreement is an unavoidable challenge that every society must address. If
disagreement alone was grounds for self-determination, then self-determination would occur
down party pollical lines. Moreover, since disagreement is inevitable, there could be no such
thing as society as every proposed society would be created with the grounds of its own fracture.
Hence, advocating self-determination on the grounds of disagreement alone is untenable.
There’s a clear link between disagreement and seeking self-determination. One set of
people feels the negative aspects of disagreement more than others: entrenched minorities. Being
a member of an entrenched minority is frustrating and may even feel hopeless. The political
changes that one wishes to see are consistently and predictably voted down. If this happens over a
long period of time, one can imagine that the predictive ease with which one’s loss can be
forecasted has an air of inevitability. It’s easy to see how under these conditions the political
system itself might become tainted in one’s perspective. Members of entrenched minorities may
come to believe that their political institutions are weighted against them in various ways.
Perhaps through corruption or collusion. It’s easy to see how members of entrenched minorities
would feel a loss of pollical agency and be tempted by apathy.
Liberal nationalists enter this context with the following argument. Trying to resolve
disagreements between different cultural groups using impartial means will create entrenched
political minorities with no means to gain political expression for cultural interests which are
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necessary for individual autonomy.15 Democratic processes, e.g., count political preferences
equally, but they also treat cultural perspectives equally. Without the special political protection
that only members of a culture can provide, unique and valuable cultures are likely to peter out.
This tragic outcome is the inevitable result of treating cultural interests like political preferences.
When cultural groups within well-functioning liberal democracies seek self-determination, they
are seeking to reorganize the boundaries of the political unit in order to give their cultural
perspective special representation in the political process and avoid the inevitable decline that
results from supposedly benign neutrality.
For my purposes here, I only want to point out that even if this argument reaches a false
conclusion, it’s not obviously false, so sincere political actors will believe that it is true.
Furthermore, cynical political actors may recognize that they will be better placed to achieve their
political aims if they act like it is true. I take it that these claims are undeniable. Given that being
part of an entrenched political minority is frustrating and/or hopeless for the reasons canvassed,
yet the fact that a group is an entrenched political minority is not reason alone to reorganize
political boundaries in one’s favor, it’s no surprise that other sorts of reasons for reorganizing
political society become attractive. It’s easy to see how reasons that make one’s political minority
group culturally distinct would become more salient and how an argument could be made that
this cultural unity is what provides legitimacy to one’s desire to break free of predictable political
losses and find more political agency in a newly constituted society.
I claim that self-determination is a way to achieve political gains, so it would be no
surprise if groups sought it for that reason rather than for its own sake. Moreover, there is no way
15
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to separate the achievement of self-determination from the political gains that are achieved in
tandem with it, so we can’t distinguish between groups that seek self-determination for its own
sake from groups that seek self-determination for political gains. I don’t need to show that these
groups actually are seeking self-determination for political gains, only that this explanation can’t
be ruled out. Therefore, the fact that some minority cultural groups in well-functioning
democracies seek self-determination is not conclusive evidence of its intrinsic value to them. It’s
true that it is evidence that they are not seeking self-determination to escape injustice, or achieve
democracy, but it can’t be ruled out that they’re seeking other political gains.
I’ve argued, pace Miller, that we can’t take the behavior of groups that are seeking selfdetermination as conclusive evidence of self-determination’s intrinsic value. I interpret Miller as
presenting a second argument for the intrinsic value of self-determination, however. He aims to
show that self-determination is an extension of autonomy. Since autonomy is intrinsically
valuable, then so is self-determination. It’s to that argument that I now turn.

1.3: Second Intrinsic Value Argument

There are various steps involved in moving from individual autonomy to large-scale collective
self-determination. First, we begin with the claim that autonomy is intrinsically valuable. I take
this as given. Second, we move to the claim that small-scale groups exhibit collective selfdetermination and that this is valuable for analogous reasons that autonomy is valuable. Third, we
establish that large-scale groups are on a continuum with small-scale groups in this regard, so
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they can retain the intrinsic value preserving features, and thus exhibit intrinsically valuable selfdetermination.
I won’t disagree with the claim that small-scale self-determination is intrinsically
valuable just as autonomy is intrinsically valuable. Specifically, self-determination seems
intrinsically valuable in some interpersonal groups. By ‘interpersonal group’ I mean, roughly,
groups where each member can relate face-to-face with any other with relative ease. Examples of
interpersonal groups may be families, many workplaces, clubs, or community groups. It should
already be clear that in these groups self-determination doesn’t refer to independent statehood,
but a set of decisions relative to a meaningful range of choices that is appropriate for the sort of
group under consideration. We normally think that a different range of options is appropriate for
the self-determination of different sorts of groups, e.g., we don’t think it’s overly meddlesome to
require that workplaces advertise widely when they decide to acquire new members, whereas this
would be grievous infringement for families.
Families, clubs, and other associations can meaningfully be said to be self-determining,
but it’s clear that self-determination for these groups is much more limited than the selfdetermination at the state level. For one thing, these associations all operate within states, so
they’re all limited by law and public policy.16 We may allow a state to be self-determining
without independent statehood if we acknowledge the powers of devolved governments as
sufficient for self-determination, but this reduced degree of state self-determination still permits
some control over laws and/or public policy. The associative groups under consideration here do
not have even these reduced controls. Still, as long as they are granted some range of powers
appropriate to their context, we can meaningfully claim that they exhibit self-determination. It’s
commonly the case, for instance, that as members we vehemently defend the decision that our
16
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family or community makes when non-members try to override it, even when as individuals we
disagree with the decision ourselves. We often prefer our interpersonal groups to be relatively
free to make their own decisions (and their own mistakes) rather than make the decision that we
ourselves believe will make everyone better off.
Miller illustrates this idea with an example.
“…imagine a residential street containing many households with children. Currently, the street is regularly
used as a cut-through by speeding cars. It would be much better for the residents if the traffic could be
slowed by barriers and the street enhanced by planting greenery and creating small areas where children
could play. Then think of two ways in which such a plan could be put into effect. The residents themselves
could come together and create an association within which they could discuss the pros and cons of various
ways forward, eventually deciding, perhaps after a vote, on a blueprint for humanizing the street.
Alternatively, a local official could be sent to ask the residents for their views, perhaps administering a
questionnaire, after which the official would propose a development plan. Why might we think that the first
alternative, which embodies local self-determination, is better than the second?”17

After canvassing various alternatives, he concludes that the local self-determination of the
community group is intrinsically valuable, and he identifies the following as the intrinsic value of
self-determination: “…the value of belonging to a group that can act so as to make a difference to
the world in accordance with the formed will of its members.”18 On the face of it, this is a value
that seems straightforwardly applicable in small-scale and large-scale groups. However, as Miller
is quick to note himself, there are numerous important differences between the sort of
interpersonal groups where we may be willing to admit that self-determination seems valuable for
its own sake, and larger counterparts where we may be more skeptical. The challenge for Miller is
to assuage concerns that those differences are enough to show that small-scale self-determination
and large-scale self-determination are not on the same normative continuum, and so the largescale version cannot inherit the intrinsic value of the small-scale one.
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What are those differences? The neighborhood community group is a good example
because like nation-states, it is territorially defined. The community group has local issues which
those that live nearby will quite naturally have a special interest in resolving. We can comprehend
how a member of the neighborhood group might disagree with what the group wanted, but would
defend the right of the group to make that decision over a body outside the neighborhood making
the decision on their behalf. If self-determination can be intrinsically valuable for groups like this,
why not for nation-states too?
One big difference with the neighborhood group is that we can assume that all its
members are more causally efficacious as members of the group. The group has a degree of
power that no individual has on their own. Here, I’m not referring to how causally efficacious the
group is, however, I’m referring to the connection between an individual member’s actions and
the group’s actions. Each individual member of the community group can shape the group’s
decision in some way. If an individual raises an issue at a meeting, say, she can get an immediate
response, engage in discussion, and even if she doesn’t get her way, her comment has been aired
publicly and has garnered recognition. Minimally, she is owed a reason in response and – all
going well – she has received it. Even if the group’s final decision doesn’t embody the concerns
she raised, their decision is partly shaped in response to her contribution. Furthermore, it’s easy to
see how, if she had gotten her way, her requests would be made manifest. It’s simply a matter of
the group agreeing with her and responding appropriately.
Individuals can depend on being causally efficacious in small-scale, interpersonal groups,
but this is too idealistic in large-scale, nation-states, so one may object that membership is not
merely a difference in degree between these two sorts of group. This sort of consideration leads
Miller away from the value of the causal efficacy of membership toward the value of
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participation. Look at protests, for instance.19 Not only might the protest not achieve its aims, but
my presence as a protestor makes no difference to the protest whatsoever. Whether or not I’m
there will have no impact on whether the protest goes ahead and whether or not it succeeds has no
ties to how loud I chant, or how determined my resolve. Still, we can make sense of the protestor
who is cognizant of both these facts and yet finds value in participating in the protest. Mere
participation, in this case, is sufficient for her to feel proud of being a member. Participation is a
much lower bar than causal contribution, so it seems as equally attainable in large-scale groups as
it is in small-scale groups. As Miller notes, however, participation looks very different in
different sorts of groups, so the worry that nation-states exhibit a difference in kind persists.
The protest group moves beyond the interpersonal scale, but it is tied to the neighborhood
community group through both having a singular purpose. In both cases, the groups are formed
with a particular goal in mind which unifies all involved.20 Moreover, there are a large range of
decisions that fall outside the purview of these groups.21 Hence, in both groups, there is broad
agreement around the collective project and there is broad agreement around the irrelevancies that
need not be considered. In contrast, nation-states are marked by fundamental disagreements, so
members may not consider participation to be valuable. Quite the contrary, the current
government may be committed to projects that are anathema to what you hold dear. Rather than
being considered valuable, one’s participation in a group that undermines one’s deeply held
commitments is alienating, even shameful. The biggest challenge for Miller, then, is to describe
how large-scale liberal democracies, marked by fundamental disagreement, could consider
membership -- understood as mere participation -- in the group to be intrinsically valuable rather
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than alienating.22 Why would members consider a protected sphere of decision making for this
sort of group to be akin to the value of self-determination that we recognize in the smaller,
interpersonal arena?
To answer this question, it’s useful to focus on a group that isn’t causally connected to
group outcomes. Entrenched minorities have little reason to believe that their input is politically
effective, so if they value their membership and self-determination, then it must be for some sort
of participatory value. What sort of value could this be?

1.4: Entrenched Minorities and Two Concepts of Self-Determination

Entrenched minorities perpetually lose out in political affairs. What could cause them to
nonetheless see the political community as valuable? What could lead them to value the decisions
the group makes even when the decisions are never what they would prefer them to be? Miller
makes ‘critical use’ of Jeremy Waldron’s distinction between two families of answer to this
question.23
Waldron distinguishes between a territorial and an identity-based conception of selfdetermination.24 The territorial conception recognizes that individuals who live out their lives
near others inevitably conflict. From time to time, they will become adversarial. How ought we
address these disputes? One solution is brute force, which we want to avoid for obvious reasons.
Another is regulation by fair and equal rules and procedures. If disputants can find a fair and
22
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equal resolution, then violence can be avoided. Waldron doesn’t use the term, but for ease I’m
going to claim that disputants require an impartial resolution. Hence, the problem of proximate
others results in an interest in impartial rules to resolve disputes.
Furthermore, it’s easier if we have the same set of impartial rules for any dispute we are
likely to engage in, and clear markers to understand if there are any rule changes, so territorially
defined areas where sets of impartial rules apply are requirements to avoid disputes leading to
violence. Finally, we have interests in being part authors of these impartial rules, so a connection
between the rules and our agency is preserved. On Waldron’s Kantian account, disputants have a
point of view on how their disputes ought to be resolved and this ought to be respected.25 Hence,
we want to have impartial rules to resolve inevitable disputes peacefully, we want some
uniformity in how our likely disputes are to be resolved, and we want to have some say in how
these rules are formed. One way to undermine our connection to these rules is to permit those
who are not members of the community to make the rules for us, so to guard against this, we want
the impartial rules the community decides upon to enjoy protected status. We want a right of selfdetermination.
The territorial conception is too thin according to Miller because it’s unclear how the
problem of proximate others is sufficient to establish self-determination as valuable. Why can’t
dispute resolution be regulated by the rules implemented by a benign colonizer? Furthermore,
Miller doubts whether impartial rules can resolve disputes between different ethnic groups. He
argues that the majority ethnic group is likely to use the impartial rules to secure more advantages
for themselves at the expense of the minority ethnic group.
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Instead, Miller prefers the identity-based conception of self-determination. On identitybased accounts, members have a shared cultural identity which unifies them across time. This
provides them with a shared set of reference points that they can appeal to when making
decisions. A shared language, history, or common set of experiences can be taken for granted and
used as unifying features to overcome knotty issues. Furthermore, identity sharing is valuable
because it bonds members emotionally as well as practically. This makes everyone more strongly
motivated to find ways to deal with conflicts that are acceptable to everyone. Finally, Miller
argues that sharing a nationality is linked with greater trust between members and this is socially
beneficial in a myriad of ways, including encouraging members to give sincere reasons in support
of policy and adhere to compromises.26
Miller recognizes that shared identity is not sufficient for self-determination, however.
For instance, he argues that the members of a truly self-determining community ought to be held
responsible for the decisions that the community makes, but the fact that community members all
identify with one another isn’t enough to hold them responsible. Identarian self-determination
ought to be supplemented by a decision-making process that adequately connects individual
members to group decisions. Miller’s preferred connection here is mini-publics.27 That is, small
groups of citizens taken from all walks of society attempt to resolve the political issues that
motivate them. These discussions are then factored into representative democratic politics. This
process is supposed to make the group’s decisions better connected to bottom-up processes. Note
that this solution is independent of the identity-based account, it supplements it; it’s not grounded
in identarian concerns.
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Miller’s account seems plausible for interpersonal groups, but the identarian account
must do more to show why entrenched minorities will find their membership valuable. Families,
e.g., are bonded by a shared history and individual members are easily connected to group-level
decision making. Something similar can be said of friendships and community groups. However,
this picture is complicated by these groups commonly having a common purpose and/or the range
of options they decide together being limited. That is, the fact that the community group has a
common goal, or the fact that community groups only decide on a narrow range of options, means
that it is disanalogous to a large-scale group like a nation-state. As Miller notes himself, mere
participation is sufficient in the neighborhood community group, or the protest valuable to us, but
their singular purpose sets them apart from the fundamental disagreements that are baked into
nation-states. What resources does the identity-based conception have to answer the member of
an entrenched minority in a society marked by fundamental disagreement?
I take it the identarian answer is the following. You may be losing out politically because
your minority position will not be brought about, but at least the cultural perspective that you
share with the majority has been given a voice. As an individual, you cannot speak on behalf of
the whole cultural group, and the decision-making procedure we’ve chosen has resulted in an
outcome you don’t endorse, but at least the decision has been made by those that partially share
your perspective by dint of sharing your cultural identity. Often you want an important decision
about family affairs to be made by a family member, for instance, because there is a presumption
in favor of the family member acting in the family’s best interests, aided by an understanding of
the sort of outcome the family all want. Similarly, the thought goes, political decisions have
ramifications for the health of the culture, so you want representatives of the culture involved in
these consequential decisions to ensure that one’s cultural perspective is preserved. Again, I may
disagree with the outcome, but I can be appeased that a perspective that I share with those who
18

made the decision has been given a voice. That has value to me even though I may believe that
the outcome makes us worse off overall.
The first thing to notice about this account is that it shares a commitment with the
territorial conception of self-determination in the sense that it too relies on impartial procedures.
An entrenched minority, under the identarian conception, will gain little solace from participation
in an unfair, partial decision-making procedure that’s designed to elevate the preferences of
others. If I am treated disrespectfully, it is often worse, not better, if I bear a special relationship
to the person or group that treated me that way. Whomever is included in the decision-making
process must be able to contribute on the same grounds as everyone else otherwise it is unfair and
illiberal, so liberal nationalists must find a way to marry special normative dispensation to
particular groups with due respect for impartial procedures.
One way to go would be to only permit certain identities the privilege of participating in
the impartial procedure, but of course this would be grossly unjust. When an outcome of a
decision procedure applies to all, e.g., a public political decision, then it only pays lip service to
impartiality if the participation in that procedure is only permitted through a highly selective
process. Hence, democratic procedures must include all citizens not simply all citizens of a
certain identity. The best a liberal nationalist can hope for is that the majority of those within the
boundaries of the political unit the democratic procedure ranges over share a national identity.
The fact that the identarian account makes use of impartial procedures is important
because it shows that any identity-based conception must value impartial procedures to some
degree, whereas the territorial conception isn’t obliged to acknowledge identity-based concerns.
This asymmetry works in favor of the territorial account. We can see this by looking at the sort of
complaints that an entrenched minority can raise as understood from each conception. Under the
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identity-based conception, I may be disgruntled by my political impotency, but appeased that at
least my cultural group is given a voice. However, if I am treated unfairly in the decision-making
procedure, will I still find solace in the fact that I share an identity with those who were allowed
to participate on equal grounds? Perhaps. It’s not unimaginable that our relational loyalties will
override our sense of fairness, so we can overlook this sort of treatment. However, this is the sort
of personal preference that our public politics cannot require.
It is overly perfectionistic for the state to demand that I ought to be loyal to my culture,
and it is even more extreme for the state to demand that I should be loyal to my culture at the
expense of my equal treatment alongside others. Perfectionist political views reject what they see
as overly stringent state neutrality.28 Instead, perfectionists hold that it’s apt for the state to
implement and promote particular ideals of the good life. Rather than being in the business of
promoting autonomy, for instance, the perfectionist state ought to promote valuable forms of
autonomy by closing off bad options and promoting good ones.29 Numerous grounds are offered
for why states are objectionably coercive or disrespectful to members of their jurisdiction by
enforcing perfectionist laws.30 It’s beyond the scope of this paper to adjudicate between
perfectionists and non-perfectionists. The only claim I need here is that even the identarian
conception requires fair and equal procedures, and while it’s possible that individuals may value
being treated fairly and equally less than political decisions being made by those who share their
cultural identity, this is not the sort of value judgement that a liberal state ought to be in the
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business of enforcing. If I am not permitted to vote on an issue that affects me, for instance, I may
deem my voice sufficiently represented if my cultural group voted, but this is not the sort of
judgement the state can make for me. Even for nationalists, procedural equality and fairness must
take priority over cultural identity.
This helps to bring two groups that have special grounds of complaint to the fore. First,
members who culturally identify with the majority decision-making group, but disagree with
them politically. Second, those who don’t identify with the culture of the majority decisionmaking group, either because they have no grounds to, or because they have some grounds but
don’t see themselves in that way. On what basis do these individuals intrinsically value their
participation in the group and so want protected normative status for the group’s decisions? The
identity-based conception of self-determination claims that entrenched political minorities still
hold their membership to be valuable, even though they persistently and predictably lose out in
the political process, because at least the cultural perspective they share with the group has been
given public expression in the political process. But what of those members of the entrenched
minority who culturally identify, but care less about their cultural identification than getting the
political outcome they’d prefer? What resources does Miller have to address this group? He can
claim that they’re wrong in their value ascriptions, but he’s already endorsed a Millian view of
intrinsic value. That is, the best evidence of intrinsic value is that people actually value the object
that way. However, if we are to take people’s experiences at face value like this, surely the fact
that many don’t value a thing a certain way ought to be taken seriously too.
Similarly, what about those who don’t or can’t identify with the majority cultural group?
The act of identification is at least partly experiential, so those who don’t, but have grounds to,
culturally identify can hardly be told that they are experiencing things the wrong way. It seems
highly dubious for the state to claim that an individual ought to prefer some political outcome
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because she identifies with the group that made it. To do so would be overly perfectionistic
because the state would be telling citizens what they ought to value. Even if the state is right, and
it could somehow encourage her to value the group in that way, then wouldn’t it be paternalistic
to do so? A liberal state shouldn’t be in the business of telling people what to value, so it’s
difficult to see in what way a member of an entrenched political minority would feel value in
merely participating in political life because those that make the decisions alongside her share an
identity she doesn’t value and make group decisions she disagrees with. Moreover, the fact that
the identity-based conception is utterly silent toward those that have no grounds to identify with
the group means that it cannot avoid being politically exclusionary to some who are legitimately
engaged in the political process. If the cultural majority uses its voice to choose outcomes that are
against your political interests, what could make you see special normative protections for those
decisions as valuable?
One may object that these problems equally apply to the territorial conception of selfdetermination. The difference is, however, that the territorial conception only appeals to values
that are already embedded in the political process. This is undeniable from the perspective of the
identity-based conception because their view also relies on impartial concerns. Entrenched
political minorities, on this view, are not just offered the comfort of cultural identification, but
that their view was fairly and equally considered alongside everyone else’s.
There are other objections the territorial conception must address, however. Recall,
Miller had two objections to the territorial conception. First, disagreements with proximate others
are insufficient to justify self-determination because a benign colonizer could solve that problem
just as well. Second, Miller worries that if different identity groups use impartial procedures to
settle their disputes, then the majority identity group will always bias the supposedly impartial
rules in their favor.
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This second point isn’t so much an objection as skepticism toward the possibility of
impartial resolution of disagreements. It might be true that some groups may take advantage of
their position of relative power in order to promote a façade of impartiality while they benefit
themselves, but this would simply be unjust. I see no reason to believe that these injustices are
unavoidable, but it’s undeniable that these injustices happen. This doesn’t necessitate abandoning
the possibility of impartial procedures that range over identity groups, however. It’s consistent
with the territorial conception that cultural identities may become deeply politicized, polarized,
and that one group may treat the other unjustly on identarian grounds, but the unjust treatment of
an identity group on identarian grounds is sufficient on its own to justify self-determination.
Persistent injustice, at least against a territorially defined identity group, is widely accepted as
sufficient grounds for independent statehood, so inter alia self-determination too.31
On the other hand, Miller gets something correct when he points out that disagreement
with proximate others is not enough to establish a need for self-determination. We may be likely
to fall into disputes with those near to hand, but it’s not true that the only solution is selfdetermination. A benign colonizer, at least in principle, could do as good a job. In reply, we could
point out that we have interests in being a part author in the rules that govern us. This may be
true, but it’s hardly an argument for self-determination because it simply restates what selfdetermination is and claims we have an interest in it.
A better response, I argue, is to note that there are different sorts of disagreements that we
are prone to. On the one hand, we contravene norms or interpret them in different ways. In this
sort of case, we just need an impartial arbitrator, which could plausibly be a benign colonizer. On
the other hand, we have disagreements about how to use our cooperative energy, the sort of
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government we should have, and who should be in positions of power. If we don’t resolve these
sorts of disagreements ourselves, then we will end up dedicating our time to projects that are not
our own. I’ll illustrate with an example.
Imagine a group of friends want to go to a restaurant together. Some want Italian and
some want Mexican. A third party may intervene and claim that the group’s discussions are
getting nowhere, she’s going to flip a coin, and let the issue be settled that way. The group may
complain that they didn’t flip the coin themselves or that they didn’t consent to that particular
procedure, but the method and the final decision is still fair and impartial. We can imagine them
going along with it.
If, on the other hand, the third party threw everyone a sandwich and told them to go
bowling instead, we can imagine there would be more protests. The friends want to spend their
time together at a restaurant and they’re not interested in games. Rather than provide the means to
overcome a collective hurdle, the decision of the third party takes command over how they should
spend their time. So, yes, Miller may be right that disagreements with proximate others may not
be sufficient to establish a need for self-determination, if the only disagreements we are
considering are those that require impartial arbitration, but many disagreements are not
procedural in this way. Many disagreements are about the cooperative projects we ought to
engage in, and if these are given their content by anyone apart from the group members
themselves, the members will end up spending their time on projects that are in no sense their
own. They will be working at the behest of others. In this way, we want not just individual
autonomy, but collective self-determination too.
Thus, Miller’s identity-based conception of self-determination has significant problems,
and his objections to the territorial conception are not as strong as they first seem. The territorial
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conception still has a case to answer, however. Miller’s concerns do draw attention to the primary
case that a theory proposing the intrinsic value of self-determination must deal with. Why should
an entrenched political minority intrinsically value self-determination when one of its upshots is
to deny them their political preferences? I’ve argued that the identity-based conception’s answer
to this question is inadequate. What about the territorial conception?

1.5: The Territorial Conception and Bloodlessness

One charge against the territorial conception is that it is too thin and bloodless to bond the group
in such a way that participation alone is intrinsically valuable to members. Consider another
restaurant choice example. A group of friends meet regularly to eat. They tire of bickering over
where to go, so agree to vote at the beginning of every meeting. Amy has somewhat idiosyncratic
tastes and always votes for the same place. It just so happens that the place she favors is low on
everyone else’s preferences. She needs a simple majority to support her choice to ensure that she
gets it. Week after week, this never happens. Everyone agrees that the procedure is democratic
and impartial, but after a year of this it’s easy to see how Amy will become tired of this process
that, from her perspective, feels like a formalized way to ignore her wishes. I take it that there is
something amiss with this group of friends if they don’t scrap the voting procedure on at least one
occasion and all decide to go to Amy’s preferred spot. I take this example to show that while
impartial, democratic procedures do recognize everyone equally, their formality can be bloodless
and alienating. There’s only so many times that the group can reassure Amy that her view
matters, the voting procedure accounts for it, and so she has no grounds for complaint.
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It wouldn’t be appropriate to defer to the minority position on the national scale in the
way that it is appropriate within a group of friends. The bonds of friendship are more substantial
and can require more of us, but if the perception of alienation scales up, then the problem of using
impartial procedures as a means to ignore minority positions scales up. The problem, then, is that
the impartial, democratic procedures that are supposed to unite us, according to the territorial
conception, actually alienate large swathes of the population under certain circumstances. What
can be said in defense of the territorial conception?
In the friendship case the group acknowledges that the relational bonds are more
important that strict adherence to the impartial procedure by periodically bypassing the impartial
procedure. This signals to Amy that she isn’t being ignored. The group recognizes that she
continually loses out in their decision-making process and they ignore the procedure in order to
make her feel included and acknowledged. Again, it wouldn’t be appropriate in case of the
democratic state to override the impartial process in order to go with the minority position, but
there are other ways to acknowledge and include entrenched minorities.
Democratic processes are not limited to voting procedures and democracies ought not
simply go along with majority decisions at the expense of the minority. The majority needn’t use
formal democratic procedures to silence minority groups. Of course, there will be differences of
opinion and the minority group will lose out on some things, but the majority can still negotiate
with them to assess ways to compromise or find mutually beneficial projects. In general, the
value of self-determination lies in how it is an extension of autonomy, so the majority ought to
engage entrenched minorities in ways that give them more opportunities to express and actualize
their needs and desires. Impartial democratic procedures are not only tools that the majority has to
engage the political agency of relatively powerless groups.

26

Perhaps unsatisfyingly, I don’t have answers as to how this should be done, that would
require empirical research. Miller himself, however, gives one example that might be fruitful. The
democratic mini-publics he describes are not only useable by national groups. They can be a way
of understanding the needs of all of society because they represent all of society in an
interpersonal-scale discussion where all views have to be listened to. This has the potential to
provide entrenched minorities with a way to amplify their concerns and negotiate solutions.
Whatever the particular solution might be, it must move beyond formal impartial procedures not
by bypassing them, but by supplementing them. In this way, entrenched minorities can feel
meaningfully included in society and that their concerns are respected. Mere participation can be
intrinsically valuable, not because of inherently exclusionary identarian relationships, but because
overly formal, but egalitarian, impartial procedures can be supplemented in ways that make
entrenched minorities feel that society is also working for them.
Democratic societies ought to preserve and promote dialogue between concentrations of
power and those who lack the capacity to politically gain from impartial decision-making
procedures. In keeping with this, as a speculative suggestion, we may change the intrinsic value
of self-determination from Miller’s “the value of belonging to a group that can act so as to make a
difference on the world in accordance with the formal will of its members” to the value of
belonging to a group that acts so as to make all members feel heard and acknowledged. We might
think of this as a change in focus away from self-determination as a protected sphere of action
and toward a protected sphere of complaint. It certainly sounds less romantic, but treating people
fairly, equally, and ensuring their voices are heard provides them a substantive degree of respect.

27

1.6: Conclusion

Any defense of self-determination that relies on it being efficient means to some further ends
cannot claim robust normative protection for its privileges. This normative protection is central
for liberal nationalists because their ideal is separate self-determining national groups. Seceding
power beyond national boundaries threatens the cultural unity that’s central to the nationalist
project. Therefore, establishing self-determination as intrinsically valuable is an important part of
the nationalist project.
I’ve argued that the most difficult case to answer, for any non-derivative defense of selfdetermination, is to show why entrenched minorities would support special normative protections
for group level decisions, since this would ensure their own political impotency in democratic
procedures. As Miller asks, what makes mere participation in a well-functioning liberal
democracy valuable?
Miller provides two answers. First, when we turn to the real world, we see national
groups seeking self-determination for no other reason than for self-determination itself. These
groups include political minorities, so even if we don’t have an argument showing the intrinsic
value of self-determination, the fact that they value it that way should be sufficient to show that it
is intrinsically valuable. I claimed that this explanation overlooks the fact that self-determination
provides a way for entrenched minorities to regain political agency. They may not be able to get
the political outcomes they want as part of one group, so they look to form another whose
population has a greater percentage of people that share opinion. Rather than seek it for its own
sake, minority groups in well-functioning democracies may see a chance to achieve their
narrower political aims if they succeed in gaining more independence.
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Second, collective self-determination is intrinsically valuable for analogous reasons that
individual autonomy is intrinsically valuable. Miller spends a lot of time arguing how
interpersonal groups value self-determination for the same reasons that individuals value
autonomy. He then defends the similarities and explains away the differences between
interpersonal groups and large-scale nation-states. His argument hinges on the idea that identarian
cultural relations can play the same unifying role that close bonds play in interpersonal groups.
Because entrenched minorities prefer those bonds over political gains, self-determination is
intrinsically valuable to them. However, this response has no resources to appeal to those who
don’t already hold those values, and it’s not the business of a liberal state to tell citizens that they
must value their own culture. Because personal identity is at the center of this account there is no
way to get around its exclusion of those who are different.
The territorial conception of self-determination rivals Miller’s preferred identarian
conception. He is correct to charge it as bloodless. Impartial procedures can do little to persuade
entrenched minorities that the group’s decisions are more important that their own political
projects. However, even though democratic procedures themselves must be impartial, democracy
is not exhausted by its formal procedures, so they can be supplemented by outreach programs to
engage political minorities in order to ensure that their dissent is more meaningfully heard.
Formal democratic procedures ensure that everyone may participate equally, and supplementary
programs can address the relative lack of political agency that entrenched minorities may feel.
Ideally, this provides a sense of inclusion, belonging, and/or acknowledgement. The value of
being heard alongside everyone else has a better chance at unifying diverse liberal societies than
exclusionary identarian allegiances.
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Chapter 2: Vaccine Nationalism and Basic Rights

By March of 2022, ‘more than 10.5 billion [COVID-19] vaccine doses have been administered
globally, “enough to protect the entire world population from severe symptoms, hospitalization
and death,” said UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet.’32 Despite
staggering scientific and manufacturing achievements, global vaccine rollout has been described
as a ‘monumental international policy failure’ and the world is ‘on the brink of a catastrophic
moral failure.’33 I claim this moral failing happened, is ongoing, and is rooted in a failure to
uphold basic human rights.

2.1: Nationalism and Basic Rights

I claim that nationalist hoarding of scarce medical resources violates human rights. Some of what
I will say generalizes to any sort of scarce medical resource, but I will focus on COVID-19
vaccinations, so inevitably some arguments depend on facts about deadly infectious disease and
treatment by vaccination. I will assume the most favorable conditions for nationalism, including
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the truth of liberal nationalism, the most plausible form of thoroughgoing nationalism.34 I aim to
show that, even from a nationalist perspective, the hoarding of COVID-19 vaccinations is
impermissible. This result is multiply overdetermined because vaccine nationalism violates
various duties derived from requirements to uphold human rights. Nationalists may object to the
set of rights that cosmopolitans, and others, assert. Since I am assuming a nationalist perspective,
I will ground the duties I discuss in the basic right to subsistence. The undeniability of this core
right provides a robust basis to firmly reject vaccine nationalism.
Some forms of nationalism are morally abhorrent and so obviously false. Let’s call the
unqualified prioritization of one’s co-nationals over others, chauvinistic nationalism.35 This view
denies the moral equality of persons and instead permits massive favoring of insiders at whatever
costs to outsiders. Because outsiders are simply worth less, the chauvinistic nationalist is willing
to sacrifice any number of outsiders to further the interests of the only membership that counts.
On this view, there is no minimal level of treatment owed equally to all by dint of personhood.
Outsiders can be assaulted, starved, tortured, or killed if it serves the comfort of one’s conationals. This is a common form of nationalism in popular culture, but it’s not worth serious
moral consideration, so it’s not my target here.
Liberal nationalism, on the other hand, assents to the moral equality of persons. Liberal
nationalists do not argue that one’s co-nationals have unqualified priority over outsiders. Instead,
they hold that individuals are due a certain degree of equal consideration, and in addition each
national group is permitted to advance its own interests.36 Liberal nationalists worry that rampant
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individualism is morally inadequate to account for the prominent role played by national
membership in shaping our individual identities and the greater moral and political landscape.37
Some argue that liberalism cannot function without this nationalist component.38 Strong national
bonds are required to foster the trust and group unity needed for the sacrifices members must
make for one another as required by, e.g., a social security system and democratic politics.39
National membership is not a choice, they claim, it is inextricably bound up with who we are. My
identity is unavoidably shaped by national history, language, and culture. To abstract away from
these facts in the name of moral equality distorts what impartiality actually demands and
unacceptably impoverishes moral and political theorizing. Liberal nationalists recognize that all
of humanity can make legitimate claims against us, but in the same way that ignoring the intrinsic
value of our special relationships to friends and family leads to an impoverished view, ignoring
the intrinsic value of our special relationships to our fellow co-nationals leads to an impoverished
view. Many reasons to doubt liberal nationalism have been discussed by its critics, but for the
purposes of this paper my target is the practice of vaccine nationalism, not nationalism itself, so I
will assume liberal nationalism to be true since showing that vaccine nationalism is very limited,
even from this perspective, provides the most convincing case against it. Hence, I will assume a
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key aspect of the debate in favor of nationalists: that there can be a genuine conflict between our
special duties to co-nationals and our general duties to humanity.40
Since one cannot favor one’s own at the expense of the basic rights of others, however, I
will argue that nationalists only have the wiggle room to engage in vaccine nationalism in rare
circumstances: only when vaccine nationalism doesn’t needlessly threaten basic rights, and
insiders and outsiders face an equal health risk, may nationalists permissibly favor their own.
Much of this paper will consist in arguing that these circumstances are rare. Almost all the
vaccine nationalism that countries have engaged in is impermissible. One prominent exception is
the very early stages of distribution, when a basic rights contravening distribution is unavoidable
between individuals who face an equal health risk. That is, in circumstances where cosmopolitans
would agree that an arbitrary distribution such as a lottery or a coin-flip are permissible, then –
from a nationalist perspective – vaccine nationalism is permissible. Again, I will argue that
almost all self-interested vaccine distribution fails to meet this standard.
My strategy will be to argue that vaccine nationalism violates the moral minimum that
even liberal nationalists hold is owed all of humanity regardless of national membership.41 This
moral minimum is provided by the moral and legal recognition of human rights. There is much
debate over which human rights ought to be protected and why, but since I will assume the truth
of liberal nationalism (hereafter nationalism), I will only base my argument in the most minimal
set of rights. My project here, therefore, is distinct from – yet consistent with – arguments that
aim at establishing an unqualified human right to health, so I aim to argue for a more modest
human right to subsistence health, and by doing so I hope to avoid the challenges that face a more
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full-bodied right to health.42 This is not to say that nationalists are necessarily committed to only
the most minimal set of human rights, but insofar as they are committed to any rights at all they
must be committed to basic rights.
Following Henry Shue, basic rights are those rights that must be protected for us to enjoy
any rights at all.43 Security and subsistence rights are contenders for basic rights, for instance,
while rights to education or free association are not. This is because security and subsistence
rights are logically prior to education or free association rights. I cannot enjoy a right to
education, e.g., unless I am free from threats of assault, murder, torture, etc. Similarly, without at
least a subsistence level of food, water, shelter, and health, then access to a classroom will mean
little to me. Threat of starvation, dehydration, exposure, and severe illness remove the possibility
of any meaningful educational aims. Basic rights are not necessarily more important, in some
sense, than other sorts of rights, it’s just that they are logically prior to other rights. They must get
priority when it comes to rights provision. So, again, any view that agrees there are any human
rights at all must agree to at least the basic rights.
I claim that COVID-19 vaccinations ought to be part of the healthcare measures that
result from a basic subsistence right to health, and that COVID-19 vaccine hoarding violates
various duties we have to uphold this right. A basic right to subsistence health describes a moral
minimum that we owe to all humanity. It’s clear that the threat the unvaccinated face from
COVID-19 is sufficient to push them below the threshold of subsistence health. We only need to
look at the severity of the measures that numerous governments justifiably implemented in 2020
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and beyond in response to the threat that the virus posed their populations. Huge sums were spent
supporting individuals to stay in their homes. Non-basic rights, such as education and free
association, were routinely sacrificed to keep the population safe, and to limit the threat posed to
the basic subsistence health of those necessary to keep the essentials running. ‘Unskilled workers’
became ‘essential workers’ and those risking the highest exposure were ‘on the front lines’
highlighting how they were like soldiers in combat fighting for our survival. Just as an ongoing
military campaign makes it too risky to go outside by threatening my basic security rights, the
COVID-19 pandemic makes it too risky for the unvaccinated to engage in ordinary activities by
threatening their basic subsistence health rights.
Fulfilling a basic subsistence right to health involves more than healthcare provision
since many determinants of health fall outside what we normally consider healthcare.44 Clearly,
for instance, food, water, and shelter are relevant for basic subsistence health, even though these
are not normally considered part of healthcare. Furthermore, what sort of healthcare ought to be
included in one’s basic subsistence right to health is a complex question. Countervailing
considerations, such as cost, mean that even when there are treatments available to permit me to
enjoy a subsistence level of health, this doesn’t always mean that I have the right to demand it.
Sadly, even this minimal level of health cannot be achieved for everyone. Some treatable ailments
may keep someone below a subsistence level of health, but if the treatments have formidable
costs, they are beyond what an individual can rightfully demand of others to provide for them.
What this threshold ought to be is not a question I will address here, even though I will argue that
– wherever this threshold lies – protection from COVID-19 is a component of our basic right to
subsistence health.
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This is to say that a basic right to subsistence health doesn’t entitle everyone to cuttingedge healthcare, and a precise specification of what healthcare we’re entitled to demand is
beyond the scope of this paper. As a rough guide I will, again, draw on Shue. For him, a basic
right to subsistence health means that everyone ought to have available ‘…for consumption what
is needed for a decent chance at a reasonably healthy and active life of more of less normal
length.’45 It’s clear that the widespread, persistent threat of an easily transmissible disease like
COVID-19, with its high risk of severe illness and death, is a sufficient threat to a decent chance
at a reasonably healthy and active life of more or less normal length. Furthermore, the costeffectiveness of current vaccines makes them a treatment that everyone is entitled to demand.
Provision of a vaccine doesn’t suffer from prohibitive costs, nor is it subject to other
countervailing considerations that are strong enough to count against its availability as part of
basic healthcare entitlements grounded in a right to basic subsistence health. In general, vaccines
are perhaps the single most cost-effective treatment available, as they are cheap to produce and
generally offer lifelong protection. One pre-COVID study estimates that childhood vaccination in
low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) against various infections offers returns of between 16
and 44 times the amount invested.46 While, in 2015, the estimated annual costs of four vaccinepreventable diseases was $26.5 billion in the US alone.47 Whether any particular vaccine is costeffective depends on its effectiveness on disease, its uptake within the population, and what costs
are considered to be offset, amongst other things. It's safe to say that COVID-19 vaccination is
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robustly cost-effective or cost-saving.48 This is unsurprising given how cheap and effective many
COVID-19 vaccinations are and how threatening COVID-19 is. One study estimates that in the
absence of a vaccination program in the US, by the end of 2021, ‘there would have been
approximately 1.1 million additional COVID-19 deaths and more than 10.3 million additional
COVID-19 hospitalizations.’49 If persons are entitled to any medical treatment at all, they are
entitled to vaccinations, COVID-19 vaccines included.

2.2: Basic Rights and Corresponding Duties

For all I’ve said so far, a nationalist could agree that we have a basic subsistence right to health,
but assert that this doesn’t result in a duty to provide vaccines for those in need. The issue is that
there is broad ranging disagreement about what duties such a right would entail. Some argue, for
instance, that the only duties that demand respect are negative duties to refrain from harm or
interference, whereas positive duties to provide aid are commendable, but not required. Provision
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of vaccines to LMICs by high-income countries (HIC), for instance, is praiseworthy benevolence
but doesn’t fall under what LMICs can claim as rightful entitlements. I will argue that the vast
majority of COVID-19 vaccine nationalism violates at least three sorts of duty, including positive
and negative duties, so that no matter one’s stance on the sort of duties that correspond to a basic
subsistence right to health, the vast majority of COVID-19 vaccine nationalism is impermissible.
Basic rights provide their bearers with legitimate claims or demands they can make of
others. That is, basic right claims create corresponding duties in others. What sort of duties?
Official United Nations human rights declarations talk about the duties to respect, protect, and
fulfil.50 Shue discusses a similar set of duties under different labels.51 The duty to respect is a
negative duty not to violate the rights of others. It demands that we not attack, kill, starve, cause
suffering, etc. That is, we ought to refrain from eliminating a person’s security or ability to
subsist. The duty to protect, on the other hand, is our duty to enforce the duty to respect, including
the creation of institutions aimed at upholding our duty to respect. In a perfect world, the duty to
protect would be redundant, but in the world as it is we ought to put measures in place to
incentivize and, when required, coerce persons to uphold our duty to respect. We ought to create
institutions, such as the police, with powers to stop parents from starving their children, for
instance, or to stop nefarious actors deliberately infecting others with deadly disease. It’s not
enough to simply not violate the rights of others ourselves, we must also make sure that the
vulnerable are not easily preyed upon.
Finally, our duty to fulfil is our positive duty to aid the deprived. This may be owed
because of a failure of either of the previous duties, a special relationship that one has with the
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deprived, or simply because of some natural disaster. So if a government is deliberately attacking
its own residents, or if it is incapable of providing basic needs, we have a duty to act in support of
the individuals under threat. Plausibly, this duty may fall first to the friends, family, and conationals of the deprived, and perhaps there are duties unique to these groups too. With natural
disasters, even the most well-prepared government’s institutional structure may be crippled by the
very disaster that’s causing deprivation in the first place. Our duty to fulfil includes a Samaritan
duty to provide emergency aid in dire situations of immediate threat. So when individuals enjoy
basic rights, this means that others have these duties to uphold these rights and that rights bearers
can demand these duties be upheld. Some may argue that basic rights provide some more limited
set of corresponding duties, but there is no view that can deny all of them. Next, I will argue that
COVID-19 vaccine nationalism violates each of these duties, so even those who argue for a more
limited set must be forced to admit that vaccine nationalism is impermissible in the vast majority
of cases.

2.3: Duties to Respect, Protect, and Fulfil and Vaccine Nationalism

2.3.1: The Duty to Fulfil
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If vaccine distribution is left to the open market alone, it’s clear that HICs will secure almost all
the available vaccinations.52 From the beginning of the pandemic, richer nations have used their
greater relative purchasing power, diplomatic pressure, and whatever legal means at their disposal
to secure more vaccines and other scarce lifesaving resources for their populations.53 Even with
current institutional countermeasures, such as COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX), in
place vaccine distribution skews heavily toward HICs.54 Many HICs have administered three
doses to a high percentage of their population and some are even rolling out fourth doses. In
February of 2022, the Financial Times reported that ‘the number of boosters given in high income
countries outnumbers the total of first and second doses given in those low-income countries —
and the gap is widening.’55 Moreover, from very early on, HICs hammered out deals to procure
enough vaccinations to cover their populations many times over.56 In fact, in some HICs, this
relative abundance has led to hundreds of millions of doses surpassing their use-by-date and
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being destroyed.57 Contrast this to many LMICs, where – even now, more than two years into the
pandemic – the percentage of the population who have had a first dose is just 5% and ‘only 11
percent of the whole population in Africa has received two shots.’58 It’s clear that the current
stark inequalities would be rendered even worse without the equitable distribution efforts of
COVAX, but it’s striking that even with such measures in place, the concentration of vaccinations
in the hands of the world’s wealthiest nations is high.
LMIC’s, simply do not have the resources to compete for vaccine access. Without
vaccine access their residents face a continued threat of imminent death and suffering. Hence,
LMIC’s are unable to secure basic subsistence health for their residents. With rare exceptions,
they are also crying out to be provided with vaccines.59 Given these facts, it seems clear that
HIC’s are failing in their duty to fulfil emergency medical aid to millions of vulnerable
individuals.
Given this context, it seems difficult for HIC’s to justify providing extra doses to further
reduce their population’s risk to health when the risk to health in many LMICs remains
unaddressed.60 Even providing a single dose has ‘maximal impact on severe disease in settings
with constrained vaccine supply and low coverage, where high seroprevalence often coexists with
delivery constraints.’61 Models have also predicted that protection against severe disease is high
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after the first dose, so ‘vaccine strategies maximizing supply of first doses are favoured across a
range of settings.’62 Finally, even in countries with high risk populations, increasing two-dose
coverage as a much greater effect that booster doses in fully vaccinated populations.63
Nationalists have a ready reply to this line of reasoning: conditions of absolute scarcity
mean that the basic rights of residents of HIC’s are equally threatened as those of LMIC’s. Since
the threat is equal on both sides, and HIC’s happen to be in possession of vaccinations,
nationalists are permitted to let their relationship to their fellow co-nationals be a difference
maker. Under moderately scarce conditions resources aren’t abundant, so there isn’t an endless
supply, but there’s enough to go around if goods are distributed well. This is ordinary conditions
for most everyday goods. Under conditions of absolute scarcity, on the other hand, some must do
without. There’s not enough to go around no matter how well goods are distributed. Food is
absolutely scarce during a famine, for instance, and many life-saving medical resources,
including vaccines, are absolutely scarce during the pandemic.
Conditions of absolute scarcity are intuitively favorable toward nationalist outcomes. We
can see this by comparing two cases that only differ by the context of scarcity in which
distribution occurs. Intrinsically valuable relationships seem morally irrelevant, on the whole,
under moderate scarcity, but can be a difference maker under absolute scarcity. First, moderate
scarcity. Both my mother and a stranger are starving. I am reasonably well off and have some
food, which is moderately scarce. Whom ought I give my food to? I suggest that I ought to
provide food for both my mother and the stranger. Why? Both face severe deprivation. Starvation
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poses such a dire threat to health and life that both fall below the minimal level of subsistence
living. They need immediate emergency aid, I have precisely what they need, and I can provide it
at minimal cost to myself, so I ought to provide them both with what they require. Moreover, I
am duty bound to provide food to both. Choosing to keep the food for myself, or to only provide
food to one of them, is to needlessly let the hungry waste away. While it’s plausible that it may be
worse to withhold from my mother than to withhold from a stranger, withholding from either
violates my duty to uphold their basic subsistence rights, due simply by dint of being persons.
Second, absolute scarcity. The situation is the same except now food is absolutely scarce,
so we’re under famine conditions. This time either my mother or the stranger must do without. I
may be reasonably well-off, but this makes little difference when there’s simply no more food for
me to procure. Both my mother and the stranger face basic rights violations because both are
unable to subsist without aid. I take it that it’s permissible, if not required, to favor my mother
with my food. It’s permissible that my relationship to my mother is a difference maker under
these desperate conditions. Absolute scarcity forces us to choose who should do without, and
absolute scarcity in life-saving resources forces us to choose who gets the opportunity to live.
When choosing between equally perilous violations of basic subsistence rights, it seems
permissible to let our intrinsically valuable relationships tip the balance. For nationalists, our
relationships to our co-nationals are intrinsically valuable in an analogous way to our
relationships to friends or family. The COVID-19 pandemic creates a global threat to the basic
subsistence health of everyone. Live-saving medical resources are absolutely scarce, and HIC’s
are often put in the position of whether co-nationals or strangers ought to be provided with
vaccines. Since the threat to co-nationals’ basic rights is equally perilous to those of strangers,
nationalists can let their relationship to their co-nationals be a difference maker and reserve
vaccinations for themselves. Hence, the health threats imposed by the pandemic, combined with
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absolute scarcity in life-saving medical resources, results in conditions that are more favorable to
nationalist tendencies.
Insofar as the basic rights of co-nationals and strangers are equally threatened,
nationalists have a strong countervailing reason to excuse them from upholding a duty to fulfil
aimed at protecting the basic rights of strangers. For some time now, however, it’s far from true
that the basic rights of co-nationals and strangers are equally threatened. Disparity in global
vaccine distribution is vast. It’s implausible for HIC’s to justify further hoarding of scarce
medical resources when a large proportion of their populations are fully vaccinated with two
doses, or received their third or fourth booster, and many LMIC’s have barely begun providing
their first. Furthermore, even if it were true that the threat to basic subsistence health was equal
for co-nationals and others, this wouldn’t mean that the relative wealth of HIC’s wouldn’t provide
them with other ways to discharge their duty to fulfil. Nationalists in emergency conditions may
have justified defeaters to realize the duty to fulfil by providing vaccinations, but the continued
threat to the basic subsistence health to those in LMIC’s still demands other measures, such as
providing income, suspending or writing off debt, materials, training, and whatever else may
alleviate the ongoing emergency e.g., ‘…cash for trucks, fridges, safety boxes and the other
equipment needed to get them [vaccines] to the people in need.64 Similarly, private
pharmaceuticals could choose to loosen proprietary restrictions.65 I wish to set these points aside,
however, as my task here is to explore the limits of vaccine nationalism assuming favorable
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conditions for nationalists. Hence, let’s imagine that the threat to basic rights is equal. This
needn’t stretch the imagination, of course, as this was true early in the pandemic, and it may be
true again if a new variant of Sars-Cov-2 emerges that current vaccines provide no protection
against. As I’ll argue, even under these favorable conditions, vaccine nationalism can still violate
the basic subsistence health rights of others by reneging on our duty to respect and our duty to
protect.

2.3.2: The Duty to Respect

Recall that the negative duty to respect basic rights demands that we refrain from acting in ways
that violate the basic rights of others. Most clearly, we ought not attack, kill, starve, etc. On first
pass, one may think that the hoarding of scarce medical resources doesn’t pertain to the duty to
respect. After all, the hoarding of goods focuses on not providing aid rather than, say, removing
goods that are already enjoyed. Hijacking vaccines on route to others, or forcibly commandeering
a manufacturing plant abroad may count, but – so the complaint goes – if vaccine hoarding is
wrong, it is because it is a failure to aid rather than a failure to not interfere. The problem with
this response is that the duty to fulfil and the duty to respect aren’t so neatly divided. Even if, as I
suppose above, it’s permissible to renege on our duty to fulfil, it turns out this results in an
unacceptably high risk of needlessly violating our duty to respect, because vaccine hoarding
significantly increases the chances of new Sar-Cov-2 variants emerging. These new variants have
the potential to be much more deadly because of higher transmission rates, greater vaccine
resistance, and/or a generally more dangerous pathology.
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Significantly increasing the risk of more dangerous variants recklessly risks prolonging
or worsening emergency conditions. I’ve already described how the emergency conditions
imposed by the pandemic alter the normative landscape by creating demand for scarce life-saving
medical resources. Another such change is that we acquire a duty to hasten the end and lessen the
severity of the emergency conditions themselves. Straightforwardly, this is because the
emergency conditions the pandemic creates cause widespread suffering and death. I distinguish
the pandemic from the emergency conditions that it creates because the pandemic may never
recede, yet it will hopefully cease to be a serious disaster. All things being equal, if we can
shorten or otherwise alleviate emergency conditions and we choose not to, then we have partly
caused unnecessary suffering and death. In other words, we are partly responsible for needlessly
violating the basic rights of others. Failing to provide flood defenses increases the risk to a lowlying population, for instance. One may get lucky, and the rains may never come, but the lowlying population will be rightfully aggrieved that their basic security was treated so flippantly.
Moreover, if the rain does come, then those who failed to provide the flood defenses when the
opportunity arose are partly responsible for the death and suffering that results. It is now widely
accepted that vaccine nationalism imposes significant risk of worsening and lengthening
emergency conditions.66 Perhaps surprisingly, in this way, positive and negative duties are
connected. Failure to discharge our duty to aid either results in being objectionably flippant with
the lives of others, or it results in a failure of our duty not to deprive.
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COVID-19 vaccine nationalism creates the conditions that make the emergence of a new
vaccine variant of SARS-COV-2 more likely, which significantly increases the chances of a virus
with a higher transmission rate and/or resistance to current vaccines. Significantly increasing the
chances of creating a variant with a higher transmission rate and/or resistance to current vaccines
is likely to unnecessarily lengthen and deepen the severity of emergency conditions, so it is
impermissible. What’s the evidence? Wagner et al, for instance, modeled two regions: one with
high access to vaccines, and one with low access to vaccines.67 They modelled scenarios where
the high access region shared vaccines and scenarios where they did not. (They also considered
other variables such as whether there is immigration between each region and when there is not).
The most relevant result for my discussion: ‘When the waning of natural immunity contributes
most to evolutionary potential, sustained transmission in low-access regions results in an
increased potential for antigenic evolution, which may result in the emergence of novel variants
that affect epidemiological characteristics globally.’68 What does this mean? When (1) there is a
high incidence of the virus interacting with persons who were previously infected, but whose
natural immunity has waned, and (2) when this population has low access to vaccines, this creates
conditions that are ripe for new strains to emerge. Hence, since not sharing vaccines creates
unvaccinated populations that, over time, have a high incidence of those whose natural immunity
has waned, the virus’s continued interaction with this population creates the conditions under
which new vaccine resistant variants have a higher chance of emerging.
It’s worth noting that the model predicts that if the region with high vaccine access shares
its doses, it will see an increased infection rate in the short term. These increases are not
excessive, however, and the increased potential for greater transmission and antigenic evolution
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in the longer term, make vaccine nationalism a strategy that seriously risks violating the basic
subsistence rights of both co-nationals and strangers for temporary gains for co-nationals. This
last point is important. Vaccine nationalism puts strangers and co-nationals at excessive risk.69
Vaccine nationalism is drastically short-sighted.
It’s true that vaccine nationalism has the chance to only impose risk on the global
population but secures guaranteed gains for co-nationals. Hence, one may object that the
nationalist has room to accept guaranteed gains for their own over imposing some degree of risk
on the global population. It’s true that the level of risk imposed must pass some threshold to be
significant enough to become impermissible to impose. I contend that the new variants that have
actually emerged, and the increased global threat they have posed, is evidence enough that we
ought to take actions that increase the threat of new variants of concern very seriously.
Furthermore, it’s worth stressing that vaccine nationalism benefits one population, but it doesn’t
simply increase the risk that new variants will emerge in one location, it delays a meaningful
response to need in an array of locations across the globe. The longer the vaccination rate remains
low at each of these locations, the more opportunities the virus has to evolve in ways deleterious
to health. Finally, it’s crucial to not only bear in mind the degree of risk, but the kind of risk. If a
new variant of concern emerges, it poses an irreversible and permanent threat. There is no way to
turn back the clock. As we have already seen, there is no containing or irradicating Sars-Cov-2. It
will spread and establish itself globally despite our best efforts. New variants have required
reversals of lockdown measures, caused more people to become seriously ill, and have caused
many additional deaths. This has drastically increased the severity of emergency conditions and
plausibly lengthened them by months, if not years. It’s difficult to imagine what sort of
69
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extraordinary, but local, threats a nationalist could cite to justify prioritizing the short-term needs
of co-nationals in the face of such significant longer-term threats to both co-nationals and the rest
of the global population.
I have argued that vaccine nationalism is impermissible because it violates basic
subsistence health rights. It does this by reneging on our duty to fulfil and our duty to respect.
Moreover, reneging on our duty to fulfil causes us to impose unacceptable levels of risk, or fail in
our duty to respect, so it’s no defense to claim that positive duties to fulfil are less stringent than
negative duties to respect. Nor is it a defense to make the stronger claim that we are only bound
by duties to respect and not by duties to fulfil. Facts about infectious disease and vaccine
nationalism show that vaccine nationalism is not only bad for outsiders but for insiders too. It not
only leads to violating the rights of strangers, but it is against national self-interest as well. I take
it that this provides a very strong case against vaccine nationalism, especially considering that my
strategy has not been to argue against nationalism, but assume its truth. This shows that even
nationalists ought to abhor vaccine nationalism. I’ll finish by discussing the duty to protect
because this will show that the case against vaccine nationalism is multiply overdetermined. I will
also make the case that given current institutional structures, some degree of vaccine nationalism
might be difficult to avoid.

2.3.3: The Duty to Protect

Currently, it seems clear that vaccine nationalism is rampant, and nations are failing in duties to
uphold basic subsistence rights. I want to finish, however, by suggesting that even if nations were
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much more compliant with COVAX and other international institutions, they would still fall short
of impartially upholding basic rights. The duty to protect is our duty to enforce the duty to
respect, including the creation of institutions aimed at upholding our duty to respect. That is,
since duties to respect are so important, and the world is imperfect, it’s insufficient if we only
abide by our own duties to respect, we must also establish institutions to incentivize, promote,
and make efficient their discharge by all. When it comes to COVID-19, it seems like compliance
with the capable institutions we have is all that’s required.
COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX), is co-lead by the Coalition for Epidemic
Preparedness Innovations (CEPI); the GAVI Alliance; and the World Health Organization
(WHO).70 For hundreds of millions of people, it is the best hope they have of getting access to
any vaccine whatsoever. It’s true that COVAX has faced many criticisms: a lack of transparency;
failure to include LMICs in governance; too much deference to HICs and private organizations;
lack of a democratic mandate; and over reliance on a narrow vaccine portfolio. 71 Hence, there are
structural improvements that COVAX could engage in, but arguably these structural changes aim
at warding off the unbridled self-interest of private actors and the vaccine nationalism of
countries.72
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Many of COVAX’s failures are the result of rich countries failing to provide the funding,
or the vaccine doses required, for COVAX to deliver on its aims.73 One of the biggest setbacks to
COVAX vaccine rollout was the Indian government appropriating its vaccine manufacturing
capacity for its own residents.74 Regardless, this still happened in the context of HIC’s
withholding funds and vaccines. For these reasons, COVAX missed its first deadline of
delivering a billion vaccines by the end of 2021, and this shortfall was especially pronounced
across African countries.75 Moreover, by some estimates it is ‘highly unlikely’ to meet its current
target of 70% immunization coverage by mid-2022.76 However, it’s easy to imagine a COVAX
that could address these concerns. Under such conditions, we might think that if a country were to
do its fair share in delivering needed resources to COVAX, then this may permit some degree of
favoring its own residents with the remainder. Plausibly, countries are only duty-bound to deliver
their fair share of support to the global vaccination drive. Surely, abiding by the demands of
COVAX would be sufficient for a country to discharge its duties to fulfil, respect, and to protect.
There is some reason to believe, however, that compliance with these institutions still
runs the risk of indulging basic rights violating nationalism. I want to make clear at the outset that
COVAX does fantastic work, and an ideal institutional set-up would probably contain something
very like COVAX. My only point is that the current international institutional structure, which
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COVAX is a part, may lean toward favoring HICs at the expense of LMIC, so avoiding all
vaccine nationalism requires HIC’s to not only be diligent about the impact of their own actions,
but the institutional context from which they act. My aim in this section is not to establish that
support for current international institutional structures alone violates basic subsistence health
rights. Instead, I only wish to point out the various hurdles facing a view which claims that
support of current global health institutions is sufficient to discharge our duty to protect.
Global health governance, according to Jeremy Youde, comprises all the formal and
informal institutions, rules, and processes which various state and non-state actors use to rise to
the health challenges that require international collective action.77 He discusses four major
contributors to global health governance: the World Health Organization (WHO); the
International Health Regulations (IHR); Development Assistance for Health (DAH); and the Bill
& Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF). I could make my argument by focusing on any one of
these institutions. I will concentrate on the WHO alone as it provides a particularly rich example.
Since 1948, the WHO has been the United Nations’ (UN) special agency for international
health. All 194 UN member states, except Liechtenstein, have accepted its Constitution in
accordance with their domestic legal procedures. The Constitution states the WHO’s aim is ‘the
attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health’ with a mandate to ‘act as the
directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work.’78 Only states can join the
WHO, but the Executive Board can enter into ‘official relations’ with non-state actors. As Youde
points out, this allows for non-state actor involvement, but it does so entirely on the WHO’s terms
without providing procedural transparency on how it does so. In 2016, the WHO tried to address
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these transparency concerns by adopting the Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors
(FENSA). While the WHO remains the coordinating agency for international health concerns,
FENSA recognizes that the WHO’s policy aims can be furthered by collaborating with non-state
actors. In theory, constructive collaborations toward these policy aims are surely commendable,
but in practice the worry is that this enables private groups to associate with the WHO for
whitewashing and use their influence for regulatory capture.79
Capture occurs when a public authority makes rules to promote special interests rather
than the public interest. As Ayelet Berman points out, regulatory capture can take three different
forms.80 The WHO may lack its own expertise in a given area and so be vulnerable to
informational capture (think of the tobacco industry’s influence on cancer science or the oil
industry’s influence on climate science); insofar as certain groups are better represented in
decision-making the WHO is vulnerable to representational capture; finally, resources capture
may occur for many reasons e.g., a sense of loyalty to a funder or funds being given on the
condition that they’re earmarked for a certain purpose. However, the WHO is not just at risk of
regulatory capture from private actors, but states too. After all, we may ask ‘in whose public
interest?’ National public interest or global public interest? States may exert an outsized influence
over the WHO on information distribution, decision-making, or financial contributions for their
own national public interest which need not be in the global public interest.
The WHO is not a wealthy organization.81 Its budget for 2020-2021 was $5.84 billion.82
That’s a little less than US spending on ‘casual dining furniture’ in 2020; less than a third of US
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Father’s Day spending in 2021; and about the same as US spending on mobile app games in the
third quarter of 2021.83 Broadly, the WHO receives two types of funding: assessed contributions
and voluntary contributions. Assessed contributions come from member states and is determined
by factors such as population size and GDP. Pursuant with the WHO’s aims, it has discretion on
how it uses assessed contributions. Voluntary contributions, however, come from a broad range
of actors and are earmarked for specific goals as described by the donor. A small percentage of
voluntary contributions are given toward the WHO’s core programming, but the vast majority is
tailored toward the donor’s aims, e.g., polio eradication or HIV/AIDS treatment. As a percentage
of its budget, assessed contributions have declined from as high as 80%.84 In recent years, they’ve
consistently been at less than 20% of the WHO’s overall funding.85 A higher percentage of its
budget coming from voluntary contributions results in the WHO having less control over its
operations and being more beholden to the interests of its donors. Around half of voluntary
contributions comes from non-state actors and the other half comes from member states.86
When its assessed contributions and voluntary contributions are combined, for instance,
the US was the biggest contributor to the WHO’s budget in 2018-2019. Followed by the UK;
BMGF; GAVI Alliance; Germany; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs;
Japan; European Commission; Rotary International; National Philanthropic Trust; UN Central
Emergency Response Fund; Kuwait; World Bank; Norway; China; Sweden; Canada; Republic of
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Korea; Australia; and France.87 We ought to worry about regulatory capture by private actors, and
one may also worry about non-democratic philanthropic organizations having such a large
influence over the WHO, but here I will focus on the possibility of large voluntary contributions
gaining outsized influence for national interests. After all, with some important exceptions, the
above list of major funders skews heavily toward western high-income countries. Of course, there
are very good reasons why the richest nations do (and ought) to contribute the most. My claim is
that we should be clear-eyed about the associated risks and consider mitigating strategies.
Perhaps the best illustration of how the WHO may be influenced by its public and private
donors was in 2006 when the Indonesian minister of Health, Siti Fadilah Supari, invoking ‘viral
sovereignty’.88 To understand the viral sovereignty case, we need some context.
The first recorded case of H5N1 influenza, also known as ‘bird flu’, infecting humans
was in 1997 in Hong Kong, where 18 people were infected and 6 died. The next known human
case was in 2003, in China, where 3 people were infected and 2 died. In the ensuing years many
millions of birds died due to H5N1 or were killed due to worries about its spread. Still, it spread
all over Asia and it reached Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. More people died too, and
several prestigious individuals and institutions projected disastrous outcomes. According to
Youde, a pre-presidential Obama partnered with another senator in 2005 to warn that an H5N1
pandemic would ‘kill millions, destabilize Southeast Asia, and undermine governments.’89 The
British Civil Contingency Secretariat called the H5N1 threat as serious as terrorism. In 2004,
WHO officials estimated that 2-7.4 million people could die of H5N1. After being criticized for
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being too conservative, the WHO altered the upper range to 50 million and claimed that 7 million
deaths was the ‘best case scenario.’90 There was clearly a lot of fear around what H5N1 might do.
Politically, the process that H5N1 was undergoing is called ‘securitization.’ The
securitization of global health refers to how some health issues are framed. It makes a difference,
for instance, if something is framed as a humanitarian crisis, a legal issue, or a threat to national
and international security.91 If policymakers convince others that a health issue is a security issue,
then this elicits different reactions. It’s likely to raise the prominence of the issue and intensify
the response ‘because it can turn a disease on the other side of the world into a security threat for
faraway countries—or for the world as a whole.’92 The securitization of H5N1, in particular,
encouraged states to hoard vaccines and treatments; alters the actors involved in planning and
response; and caused states to pay a lot more attention to the Global Influenza Surveillance
Network (GISN).93
The WHO created GISN in 1952 to monitor global influenza strains in human
populations.94 It relies on member states to share influenza strains with various Collaborating
Centers around the world. This is particularly important for early identification of new strains
with pandemic potential. There’s no legal backing to enforce the GISN, but since all states benefit
from pandemic preparedness, they all willingly share samples.
Indonesia’s first cases of H5N1 were in 2005 when 25 people were infected and 13 died.
In 2006 there were another 55 cases and 45 deaths. Globally, the virus’s spread was limited
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because there was no human-to-human transfer. All infections were due to close contact with
chickens. There was grave concern, however, that the virus was mutating. In Indonesia, in May
2006, the WHO identified a family cluster who all died of H5N1 in quick succession. This led to
worries of human-to-human transmission, but this couldn’t be determined by epidemiological
data alone, so the WHO requested virus samples from Indonesia.
It's in this context that Supari invoked ‘viral sovereignty’ and declined to share the
samples. She claimed the samples were part of Indonesia’s biological heritage and used the 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity, which states that countries have a right to determine access
to their biological resources, to make her case. It’s easy to see her actions as endangering the
world for the sake of personal or national self-interest. After all, it would likely have personal
consequences for Supari as Minister for Health, as well as national consequences, if Indonesia
was identified as the epicenter of a new pandemic. Supari’s stated justifications were quite
different. First, she claimed the WHO and GISN presented the results of sample analysis at
various international meetings without the permission or involvement of Indonesia. This, she
claimed, was unethical and contravened the WHO’s own guidelines. Second, she claimed the
WHO violated its own guidelines around intellectual property rights (IPR) and undermined trust
through seeking patents on modified H5N1 samples that GISN had obtained from Indonesia.
Third, she claimed that GISN violated the trust of Indonesia and other LMIC’s by maintaining a
system that only benefited Western states and denied LMIC’s the same access. Fourth, the WHO
was already sharing previous Indonesian samples with an Australian pharmaceutical company,
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories, which intended to make a patented H5N1 vaccine. She
argued this was also against WHO standards, and that it was unfair that a private Western
company would profit from Indonesia’s samples when Indonesians wouldn’t receive, and
couldn’t afford, any vaccine that might result. Instead of sharing the virus samples with GISN,
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Supari said she would share them with two Indonesian institutions for identification and she
announced that Indonesia was in talks with a US-based pharmaceutical company, Baxter
Healthcare, who would let Indonesia retain IPR and ensure access to any vaccines that result.
It’s easy to initially read Supari’s actions as objectionable nationalism, but it can also be
seen as a criticism, and response to, an institutional context of nationalism – that favors the
interests of rich western nations and certain pharmaceuticals – created by the institutions of global
health governance. GISN is an instrument of the WHO that’s ostensibly for the global public
good of health. However, practices like the WHO’s patent attempt, and its talks with a private
pharmaceutical company to develop a vaccine with exclusive access, belies the WHO’s possible
regulatory capture by HIC’s, and private pharmaceutical companies. The securitization of H5N1
is a potential a mark of this bias as well as an opportunity for Indonesia, on behalf of all LMIC’s,
to try to regain some control.
The securitization of global health tends to favor HIC’s because it focuses primarily on
infectious disease threats, which – however inaccurate the perception – are seen as emerging from
LMIC’s with the possibility of infiltrating HIC’s to attack their populations. This focus is not
only at the expense of non-communicable diseases, but communicable diseases, like malaria,
which aren’t seen as threatening to rich, western nations. Smallpox illustrates this point well. The
US eradicated smallpox from within its borders, so stopped vaccinating its population. It was only
after a traveler brought smallpox back to New York, and the following panicked snap vaccination
of millions, that the US and other HIC’s realized that purely protecting their own wasn’t enough.
The virus remained a threat to Americans wherever in the world it persisted, so – the eventually
successful – global eradication of smallpox began. The securitization of health continues this
pattern of targeting diseases that are viewed as threats to HICs, at the expense of diseases that
compose the largest global health burden.
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As Supari’s viral sovereignty case illustrates, the securitization of health also provides an
opportunity for LMIC’s to push back. The increased threat profile of H5N1 made the Indonesian
samples more valuable. The fear of H5N1 permitted Supari to use access to the samples as
political leverage to instigate change. Understood as providing a global public good, the GISN
relies on voluntary participation to achieve its ends, but if those ends skew toward certain groups,
those left out are incentivized to withdraw cooperation.
One may argue that it is reckless for Supari to threaten the success of achieving the good
of global public health. However, it’s worth noting that even during the height of the viral
sovereignty case, Indonesia continued to report to the WHO about human infections, permitted
other WHO virus sharing collaborations to continue, and never interrupted its sharing of H5N1
virus samples from chickens.95 Moreover, recall that Supari also pledged to send the contested
samples to Indonesian institutions and began a favorable bilateral deal with a US pharmaceutical,
so it could be claimed that she aimed to minimize any potential global threat as well as obtain a
deal favorable to LMIC’s.
It seems like Supari’s actions had some success. A new Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Framework (PIPF) was unveiled in 2011. It addressed ‘questions of multijurisdictional
surveillance and benefit sharing’ and ‘inequities around access to needed vaccines.’96 Youde lists
four changes. First, it changed the name of GISN to the Global Influenza Surveillance and
Response System (GISRS). Second, member states agreed to virus sharing consistent with new
standard material transfer agreements (SMTA), and GISRS committed to sharing data, analyses,
and trackability information with labs and originating states. Third, candidate vaccines must be
shared with manufacturers and member-states that requested them. It would aid collaboration
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between the Global North and the Global South, vaccines were directed to be stockpiled, and
some proportion earmarked for LMIC’s. Fourth, it created two SMTA’s, which governed virus
sharing between member states and laboratories, and other organizations outside GISRS, like
vaccine manufacturers. This meant that private companies that received samples were required to
make financial and/or vaccine contributions, which total half of GISRS’s annual operational
budget. Companies also agreed to other commitments like donating a percentage of their vaccine
production to the WHO; granting licenses to generic pharmaceutical manufacturers; and reserving
anti-viral output for LMIC’s at reduced prices. This leads Youde to claim that ‘Supari and the
Indonesian government can rightly take credit for pushing the global community to negotiate the
agreement which created the PIPF.’97
Hence, the viral sovereignty case shows how full compliance with the institutions of
global health governance isn’t always enough, and how their reform can require resistance and
further action. Importantly, it shows how compliance with the most well-meaning of institutions
can inadvertently prop up global institutional structures that bias nationalistic concerns, and thus
it shows just how vigilant international actors ought to be to protect against such measures. This,
of course, doesn’t show that COVAX is biased in a similar way, but it shows the relevant
concerns that must be addressed before full compliance with such institutions can be deemed an
adequate discharge of our duty to protect.98
Moreover, it highlights further, perhaps overlooked, dangers of COVID-19 vaccine
nationalism. After all, if LMIC’s perceive that the institutions of global health governance are
biased against them, then what’s to stop them resisting collaborative measures against COVID19? The securitization of health shows how HIC’s rely on LMIC’s to cooperate for their own
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safety. Imagine a situation where a LMIC, in desperate need of vaccines, refuses to share data
regarding a new variant of concern with the WHO. I’m not claiming that they would be justified
in doing so, but insofar as LMIC’s have legitimate grievances, and HIC’s engage in vaccine
nationalism, then HIC’s are at least partly responsible for further endangering global public
health. The drive for global public health requires cooperation and HICs endanger this goal by
withdrawing cooperation in favor of unilateral self-interest. It would be no surprise if LMICs
respond in kind.

2.4 Conclusion

Permissible nationalism can never happen at the expense of the basic rights of others. COVID-19
vaccine nationalism violates our positive duties to aid those in LMICs. Furthermore, failing to
discharge our positive duties toward LMICs violates or negative duty not to needlessly prolong
and deepen the severity of the pandemic. Together these provide very strong reasons against
COVID-19 vaccine nationalism. Finally, vaccine nationalism is multiply overdetermined and
protecting against it requires diligence. Even if a country would fully comply with current
international institutions pertaining to vaccine distribution, this is not enough if support of those
institutions tends to burden LMIC’s in ways that focus the benefits on rich countries.

61

Chapter 3: Eco-sabotage as Defensive Activism

3.1: Introduction

Founded in 1977, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS) has sabotaged many whaling
expeditions, resulting in some minor injuries but no deaths. At sea, SSCS have damaged
propellers with entangling lines, thrown butyric acid on deck (a product of rancid butter, it’s a
nauseating skin and eye irritant), and rammed ships.99 In port they have scuttled (empty) whaling
ships and sunk them using limpet mines. They claim responsibility for sinking at least 10 whaling
ships and causing millions of dollars of damage.100 Their tactics are effective. Japan’s whalers,
alone, admit to many hundreds’ fewer whales caught year on year because of SSCS’s activities
and they withdrew from Antarctic waters entirely because of Sea Shepherd’s efforts.
The 1,172-mile-long Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) currently transports 750,000
barrels of oil a day and aims to increase capacity to 1.1 million. Proponents claim it is the ‘safest
and most efficient’ way to transport crude oil.101 Opponents protest that oil extraction and use,
especially at this scale, emits massive amounts of environmentally destructive greenhouse gases
(GHG), pipe leaks and bursts threaten the water supply and broader environmental disaster, and
indigenous groups object to the desecration of culturally important land.
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On July 24th 2017, Jessica Reznicek and Ruby Montoya claimed responsibility for
burning $2.8 million of DAPL’s construction machinery, and using oxyacetylene torches and
gasoline-soaked rags on the pipeline itself. ‘Some may view these actions as violent, but be not
mistaken.’ They claimed. ‘We acted from our hearts and never threatened human life nor personal
property.’102 According to Stop Fossil Fuels, Reznicek and Montoya caused around $6 million in
damages and delayed oil flow for 2 months. Reznicek has been sentenced to 8 years in prison.
Montoya awaits sentencing.
Eco-sabotage is always illegal, commonly involves property destruction, and aims to
protect animals or the environment.103 I will assume that eco-sabotage is prima facie morally
impermissible. However, just as property destruction is prima facie impermissible, yet destroying
an attacker’s weapon in self- or other-defense is permissible, I will argue that eco-sabotage can be
permissible as an act of defense. This is not just an analogy or metaphor. I mean to argue that
eco-sabotage can actually be a form of defense, and this can provide grounds for its moral and
political justification. Not all acts of eco-sabotage are justified, and perhaps not all justified acts
of eco-sabotage are justified because they are acts of defense, but I aim to show that – pace critics
– defensive theories of eco-sabotage are morally and politically sensible, so need not only be the
purview of extremists, and that defensive theories can provide a more appealing justification than
rival theories.
Permissible eco-sabotage challenges the idea that a just society can only be maintained
by adherence to a strict form of pacifism, that property rights have equal priority alongside other
102
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important rights, and it raises difficult questions regarding the boundary between bypassing
deliberative democratic ideals to impose one’s view on others and rightfully holding society to
account for moral transgressions. Furthermore, whenever political property destruction makes
headlines, heated debates over whether certain events are riots, protests, or something else ensue.
Getting clear about the limits of permissible activism may help us gain clarity on these issues and,
by implication, what a healthy democracy looks like. I have two aims. First, frame eco-sabotage
as defense using just war theory. Second, argue that my version of defensive eco-sabotage is
more justified than rival theories.
If permissible, eco-sabotage is an illegal yet morally permissible act, is eco-sabotage a
form of civil disobedience? According to Rawls, civil disobedience occupies a space between
conscientious objection and revolt. The former is illegality based on one’s private morality and
the latter is an outright rejection of government. Civil disobedients, by contrast, appeal to a public
sense of justice. By publicly announcing their intentions and willingly submitting to arrest, they
draw attention to the injustice of the law they reject. For Rawls and others, civil disobedience is
an illegal, yet public, nonviolent, and conscientious act done with the aim of changing the law.104
Moreover, it is an act of last resort. Only after all legal means have been exhausted can civil
disobedience become an option and there are no further actions, short of revolt.
If eco-sabotage is permissible, it challenges Rawlsian civil disobedience. Eco-sabotage
goes beyond civil disobedience because it is violent (if only toward inanimate objects).105
Furthermore, it is often clandestine, not public. In many cases, eco-saboteurs would thwart their
own aims by declaring their acts in advance. So, if permissible eco-sabotage is illegal action that
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appeals to the public sense of justice, it seems like civil disobedience but undermines the
Rawlsian definition. If it’s permissible illegality that isn’t civil disobedience, then it still
undermines a Rawlsian definition of civil disobedience by replacing it as an act of last resort.
As a violent act that bypasses legal means of dispute resolution, eco-sabotage may seem
like terrorism. The US government, for instance, unequivocally classifies eco-sabotage as
terrorism. Whether or not one thinks eco-sabotage (or even terrorism) is permissible, this position
is problematic because insofar as eco-saboteurs only target inanimate objects, this puts them in a
morally different category from those that target persons.106 Many complain that lumping these
groups under one banner both cheapens the charge of terrorism and is strategically
counterproductive in combating extremism. One may think damaging propellors and burning
holes in pipelines is morally impermissible, but the comparison to, say, bombing innocent
civilians is gratuitous.107 Lacking nuance here has serious implications since charges of terrorism
permit a much more serious invasion of civil liberties. Not only does this violate the rights of
environmental activists, but can plausibly lead to more extremism, not less, both due to
indignance against an overblown invasion of civil liberties, and the concern that committed
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activists may decide to commit a crime befitting of their likely punishment. I will elaborate on the
differences between permissible eco-sabotage and terrorism further in what follows.
I will divide the eco-sabotage literature into two camps. On the one hand, there are
broadly consequentialist views. Michael Martin, for instance, writes that ‘there is no reason to
suppose that some acts of ecosabotage could not be justified on consequentialist grounds, but I
have concluded that advocates … have not provided a full consequentialist justification of its use
in concrete cases.’108 This is primarily because nonviolent acts of what Martin calls
‘conscientious wrongdoing’, such as civil disobedience, ‘also cost the government and industry a
large amount of money, and have publicity value.’109 For Martin, eco-sabotage can be justified in
principle, but in practice it falters because similar financial attrition can be achieved non-violently
without threatening society’s perception of environmentalism.110 Thomas Young broadly agrees
with this position.111 I agree that non-violent means should always be preferred, but since I argue
for eco-sabotage as a form of defense, its justification primarily hangs on the preservation of
some value, rather than public perception, or its effectiveness as a strategy of financial attrition. It
is unreasonable to make all justified activism beholden to public opinion. We often honor past
activists for going against the grain, resisting popular disapproval, and doing the right thing in the
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face of an unjust status quo.112 Our best theory ought to take stock of that fact and have the
resources to justify unpopular acts.
On the other hand, there are defensive views. There are good reasons to be skeptical of
defensive views.113 This skepticism can take different forms. For instance, Derek Turner
reconstructs an argument for a defensive view only to show that it’s invalid and Federico Zuolo
concludes that Tom Regan’s argument for pacificism can be interpreted as a defensive view with
a justificatory bar that can never be met.114 I will focus on addressing the sort of skepticism that’s
best expressed by Steve Vanderheiden. His nuanced account of justified eco-sabotage also takes
inspiration from just war theory even though he distances himself from a defensive position. He
claims that eco-sabotage’s primary strategies are financial attrition, economic disincentive, and
gaining political capital, yet it is only justified if ‘nothing less’ would ‘avert a serious wrong’.115
This could be interpreted as providing a defensive view, but Vanderheiden is explicit that ‘the
rhetoric of defensive warfare is unhelpful’ and he argues that likening eco-sabotage to selfdefense is misguided.116 This is because it comes with moral and pragmatic risks, such as harming
persons, and alienating political allies. His worries are well founded. Because defense provides an
exception to the prohibition of violence, nefarious and well-meaning actors use the rhetoric of
defense to rationalize serious harm and killing of persons. Terrorist groups such as Individualities
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Toward the Savagery (ITS) have killed at least 37 people, supposedly in defense of wilderness.117
Individuals like Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, used green politics in a similar way.
Academics are also guilty of rationalizing murder.118 Lisa Kemmerer uses just war theory
to develop a defensive view claiming ‘[w]arrior activists are engaged in an asymmetrical war of
humanitarian intervention.’119 ‘Most U.S. citizens’ Kemmerer claims ‘are abusers and exploiters,
destroyers and enablers who consume large quantities of flesh and support research on
defenseless animals.’120 According to Kemmerer, this makes most U.S. citizens legitimate targets
of war, and while such ‘tactics are likely to lead to serious injury or loss of life … such means
seem reasonable, expected, legitimate – even morally necessary in the realms of humanitarian
intervention.’121 Hence, I share Vanderheiden’s concern that the rhetoric of defense may be
coopted to rationalize morally abhorrent acts, but I argue that the tenets of just war theory
actually provide the constraints that show why targeting property is permissible while targeting
persons is not.
My strategy is the following. Taking inspiration from the principles of just war, which
can be understood as principles that describe a form of defense, I will outline the conceptual
space that different sorts of theories of defensive activism122 may occupy.123 In particular, I will
individuate four different grounds of eco-sabotage by the value that it aims to protect. I propose
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that threats to these values provide the just cause for property rights violations and therefore
purportedly justified coercion.
I will argue for numerous conditions that eco-sabotage must meet but two, sometimes
cross-cutting, standards are worth foreshadowing here.124 On the one hand, eco-sabotage must
pass a public justification because privately justified illegal acts are objectionably coercive
toward democratic society; on the other hand, it must have a reasonable chance of success
because futile defense is no defense at all. Defensive activism grounded in animal rights may
have a reasonable chance of success, for instance, but I argue it does not pass a public
justification, so it is impermissible. Defensive activism grounded in protecting persons from the
dangers of climate change, however, can easily pass public justification because it can be
uncontroversially grounded in human rights, but it struggles with showing that it has a reasonable
chance of success because the problem of climate change is vast and almost any thwarted act of
pollution pales in comparison. Finally, defensive activism that is either grounded in preventing an
extinction or preventing suffering falls somewhere between these two extremes. Neither does
particularly well or particularly badly at either a reasonable chance of success or a public
justification. To understand these claims properly, however, I must develop my just war framing,
and the four just causes.
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3.2: Eco-sabotage and Just War

The conditions of just war theory can describe justified defensive action.125 This tradition has the
resources to justify eco-sabotage without slipping down the slope to rationalize serious harm and
murder. I will focus on the conditions of just cause; proportionality; necessity; discrimination;
and (in §3.2) reasonable chance of success.
Another important factor is that just war theory seeks to describe the conditions that
justify a state of war (jus ad bellum) and the conditions that justify conduct in war (jus in bello). I
will argue that some acts of eco-sabotage may only be justifiable as part of a broader
environmental strategy, but fitting into a long-term plan is not the same as being justified under
the banner of war. Furthermore, in just war, there is debate over whether the jus ad bellum and jus
in bello conditions can be satisfied separately. The sets of conditions that I will describe as
inspired by just war theory cannot be satisfied separately (there is no permissible act of ecosabotage without just cause, for instance). For these reasons, my account will not make use of this
distinction.

3.2.1: Just Cause

Just war and justified eco-sabotage both require just cause. Eco-sabotage is doubly prima facie
wrong because, as I will assume, both property destruction and breaking the law are prima facie
wrong. Without these assumptions, my justificatory burden is only made lighter. Which reasons
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could provide just cause for eco-sabotage and make property destruction ultima facie permissible
or even required? I will discuss four possibilities: eco-sabotage in defense of rights; in defense of
species; defense against suffering; and defense against climate change.126 For now, I’m proposing
these as possible just causes. I will assess the relative merits of each later.
First, eco-sabotage as defense of rights. This could include non-human-animal rights or
animate object rights, but I will only discuss animal rights. Threat of a rights violation can
provide just cause for defensive action. Most obviously, persons enjoy various rights that can
justify defensive killing, defensive bodily harm, or defensive property destruction. For instance, a
right to life, bodily integrity, property rights, etc., may each justify various defensive actions that
are normally impermissible. If you pose an imminent threat to my life, then killing you may be a
permissible response. Sea Shepherd’s anti-whaling activities, for instance, could be interpreted as
protecting whales’ right to life. If you pose an imminent threat to my property, I may justifiably
thwart your action by, say, destroying your property first. For now, I only wish to point out that
it’s possible that if rights are actually threatened, then this could justify eco-sabotage.
Second, species-defense. Extinction due to human activity is presumptively morally
wrong. It’s difficult to explain why there is a presumption against classes of individuals no longer
existing. Classes don’t seem like the sort of thing that can have interests, for instance. Still,
assuming extinction is forever, the loss of a species is irreversible, so some humility is
recommended. Permitting extinction decides for current and all future generations. Even if we
think the loss of the species is acceptable now, we can’t be certain about the benefits the species
may provide to us, or to the ecosystem more broadly. At a bare minimum, decisions to permit
extinction shouldn’t be flippant, and easily available alternatives should be pursued if possible.
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Without this minimal level of consideration, the presumptive value of species isn’t given
sufficient respect, so the eco-saboteur has a reason to intervene. SSCS plausibly engages in
species defense when they sabotage whaling expeditions.
Third, some will hold that causing any degree of unnecessary suffering is unconscionable
whether it’s in non-human animals or humans.127 Difficulties arise in what counts as necessary,
what counts as suffering, and what sort of creatures can experience suffering, but there are many
easy cases too. Operating on great apes without anesthetic, cruel and needlessly painful slaughter
techniques, or other shockingly torturous acts provide reason to ground defensive eco-sabotage in
protection against suffering. The ALF, for instance, broke into the University of Pennsylvania’s
head injury lab, destroyed property, and exposed the deplorable treatment of baboons. Sea
Shepherd targets whalers to stop practices such as harpooning which can lead to a prolonged and
torturous death.
Fourth, defense against climate change. The reason that climate change is bad may be
parasitic on one of the just causes already discussed. Alternatively, it may be bad because of
rights violations, suffering, death, or threat of extinction in current or future humans, so it
deserves independent categorization.128 Hence, even if you are skeptical about the other putative
just causes, insofar as climate change can be directly tied to wronging humans, the case for ecosabotage can still be made.
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3.2.2: Proportionality

Just cause alone is insufficient for just war or just sabotage. Proportionality is also required.
Breaking your leg may be necessary to halt your attack, but if your attack is merely a pinch,
breaking your leg seems impermissibly disproportionate. I argue that considerations of
proportionality do not rule out eco-sabotage, but permissible sabotage will partly depend on
comparing seemingly incommensurable values.
In just war theory, determining jus ad bellum proportionality is fraught. As Michael
Walzer asks ‘How do we measure the value of a country’s independence against the value of
defeating an aggressive regime?’129 Brian Orend adds that a moment’s thought deepens and
multiplies the complexity.130 How do we compare casualties to loss of sovereignty? Short-term
and long-term benefits? Prudential and moral values?
Analogous problems arise when considering eco-sabotage. When just cause is present,
weighty moral values are at stake. On the one hand, when comparing weighty moral values and
relatively minor property destruction, the calculation seems straightforward. On the other hand,
here are four reasons that illustrate how sabotage can have serious consequences: souring public
perception of the environmental movement may result in worse moral sacrifices; individual acts
of destruction may be insignificant but taken together they may encourage property insecurity;
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nefarious actors may feel emboldened to engage in wanton sabotage; and/or authorities may point
to lawlessness to justify legislation inhibiting civil liberties.131
These are all important concerns and conscientious activists ought to be sensitive to
pragmatic issues and weighing costs and benefits. It is a mistake, however, to always favor the
route of least resistance. Upholding moral values is often costly, yet we believe it is worth it
anyway. Often activists are working against the institutional grain because the most pressing
problems are structural and wide-ranging. It is due to their disruptive impact in the face of
adversity that we honor those involved in principled resistance in the past. We praise the social
conscience of individuals and small groups of rabble rousers who were willing to upset
complacent injustice. Hence, activists must be pragmatic, but cost benefit analysis (CBA) ought
not always get priority.
A defender of CBA may press that eco-sabotage is inherently wasteful and inefficiency
costs lives. I agree that there is room for CBA, but we should have some humility in our
calculations. First, if just cause is a rights violation, then the right means little unless we’re
willing to make sacrifices to uphold it. Second, if just cause is species-defense, the stakes are very
high. If our calculations are wrong, no monetary amount will bring the species back. Furthermore,
calculating CBA over time is highly fraught and extinction is permanent. Are we so sure about
the value of a species to future generations or the eco-system more broadly? Third, if just cause is
defense against suffering, are we so sure of the supposed benefits that we are willing to impose
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such egregious harm? Fourth, if just cause is protection against climate change, then calculations
are even more fraught. How do we calculate the threat of a catastrophic chain of events or the
looming threat to current and future generations?132
Could Sea Shepherd’s anti-whaling measures or Reznicek and Montoya’s pipeline
sabotage pass a proportionality test? Sea Shepherd may find just cause in defense of rights,
species defense, or defense against suffering. Insofar as their response is relatively minor property
destruction that doesn’t put life at risk, then it seems likely that the proportionality condition can
be met, especially when those that bear the costs are well-off nation-states as in the case of the
Japanese whalers.133 Reznicek and Montoya, on the other hand, could appeal to defense against
climate change to justify the 6 million dollars of damages they inflicted. According to Stop Fossil
Fuels ‘That’s less than one sixth of one percent of the $3.78 billion pipeline budget—amounting
to a rounding error, and likely reimbursed by insurance.’ Put this way, the cost seems
insignificant. Moreover, the costs inflicted pale in comparison to the projected environmental
damages from the use and the extraction of the oil, never mind the risks of leaks and spillage.
In short, costs matter and should be taken seriously, but unwavering faith in CBA in
cases of just cause for eco-sabotage should be viewed with some skepticism. All acts of ecosabotage are destructive, and some are risky. Given that sabotage is doubly prima facie wrong,
the onus is on the eco-saboteur to carefully assess whether the risk is too great.134 I contend that
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this will not rule out every case of property destruction on proportionality grounds, but this
condition places a stringent check on defensive activists.

3.2.3: Necessity

The condition of just cause establishes that there is something of considerable value under threat.
Proportionality asks whether sabotage is an overreaction, and the condition of necessity ensures
that eco-sabotage is used as sparingly as possible. There are many intuitively appealing
illustrations of necessity. I may have just cause to stop you cutting down a tree, and destroying
your chainsaw is proportionate to the harm threatened, but property destruction is still prima facie
wrong, so if you’d be responsive to a request to desist, then its impermissible to destroy your
property when a request is sufficient. This requirement is especially pressing in democratic
society because there are many legal, non-violent avenues to stop objectionable environmental
destruction. This highlights how the necessity condition makes eco-sabotage the option of last
resort. Ideally, only once all other avenues have been exhausted may eco-sabotage be permissible.
Thus, ideally, all legal means are exhausted before one may resort to civil disobedience and only
after that may one consider eco-sabotage. This ideal picture is complicated by differing
interpretations of what counts as necessary and by imminent threats which don’t wait for due
process. There may be no time for political processes, or contacting the authorities, before
irreversible damage occurs. The necessity condition may be fulfilled because I happen to be well
placed to intervene by destroying your means to provoke just cause.
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Imminent threats don’t exhaust animal or environmental threats, however. Many
environmentally destructive development projects are planned long in advance and may be
responsive to feedback or public debate. If non-violent means have a reasonable chance of
success and the threat to life isn’t imminent, then eco-sabotage ought to be avoided. As these
alternative means are exhausted, and the threat becomes more imminent, eco-sabotage becomes
closer and closer to satisfying the necessity condition.
Could Sea Shepherd’s anti-whaling measures or Reznicek and Montoya’s pipeline
sabotage pass the necessity condition? Sea Shepherd engage in the political process and even
work alongside governments on some campaigns.135 Despite a moratorium on commercial
whaling in 1986, Japan continued to whale under the guise of scientific research and were
unresponsive to diplomatic pressure. The International Whaling Commission declared the waters
of the Southern Ocean around Antarctica a sanctuary in 1994 yet Japanese whalers continued
whaling endangered species in this area. In the face of an ineffective political process, and the
international community’s failure to enforce their own treaties, Sea Shepherd stepped in.
Moreover, they only sabotage hunts and property essential to hunts, so Sea Shepherd’s antiwhaling measures plausibly pass the necessity condition.
Reznicek and Montoya see themselves as eco-saboteurs of last resort: ‘After having
explored and exhausted all avenues of process, including attending public commentary hearings,
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gathering signatures for valid requests for Environmental Impact Statements, participating in
Civil Disobedience, hunger strikes, marches and rallies, boycotts and encampments, we saw the
clear deficiencies of our government to hear the people’s demands.’ Taking this claim on its face,
Reznicek and Montoya’s action is plausibly one of last resort. Was their action necessary to
preserve the value under threat? The answer encompasses whether it has a reasonable chance of
success. I’ll discuss this at length in §3.2.

3.2.4: Discrimination

In just war theory, the discrimination condition states that targeting non-combatants is
impermissible, while targeting combatants is permissible. Distinguishing between these two
groups is required to capture the idea that even in war indiscriminate killing is morally
objectionable. In defensive activism the discrimination condition doesn’t apply. The operative
question in war is ‘when human life is threatened, what is permissible to do in its defense?’ In
defensive activism the operative question is ‘when non-human animals or the environment are
threatened in a way that provokes just cause, what is permissible to do in defense?’ The stakes are
different, there is no war or combat in anything other than metaphor, so there are no combatants
or non-combatants. This is not enough to support my claim that persons are not legitimate targets
for defensive activism, however. It’s still open to an objector to insist that animate non-persons
are sometimes of comparable value to persons. There are at least three ways to reply to this
objection. One general reply and two specific to the theory defended here.
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When, if ever, is the death of a person going to be considered proportionate to animal or
environmental destruction? My answer here foreshadows an objection I cover in §3.1. If you do
believe that foreseeably killing someone is proportionate to the threat posed, this cannot be
grounded in a thin enough conception of morality that the activist could plausibly claim to appeal
to democratic society’s common commitments. Any view of the commensurability of the value of
human life compared to other forms, or classes, of life will be based in some highly contentious
moral view, so extra-judicial acts grounded in this basis must appeal to an idiosyncratic moral
view and impose it on an unwilling public.136 To avoid this, we should appeal to a justificatory
base that it’s impermissible to reject.
The next two replies draw on proportionality and necessity. First, to bring the
proportionality condition into focus, I assume that killing a person is necessary to defend just
cause. Recall the four reasons that sabotage may be considered disproportionate and therefore
impermissible and note how they just become stronger if we’re considering taking human life:
souring public perception of the environmental movement; numerous killings will likely make
everyone feel terrorized; nefarious actors may feel emboldened to engage in wanton killing;
and/or authorities will likely point to lawlessness to justify legislation inhibiting civil liberties. I
noted that parallel considerations required serious consideration in the case of property
destruction for eco-sabotage. These considerations are even more weighty when put in the context
of taking human life. Moving from property destruction to the taking of human life is not just a
difference in degree, but a difference in kind. It’s difficult to imagine cases where taking a life
would be proportionate when we consider any one of these proportionality reasons. When taken
together, they are mutually sufficient to show that targeting persons is impermissible.
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Second, to bring the necessity condition into focus, I will assume that killing a person is
proportionate to protect the life under threat. When, if ever, could killing a person be considered
necessary for animal or environmental protection? I submit that it’s vanishingly rare that targeting
a person would ever pass the necessity condition. This is because the sort of actions that provide a
defensive activist with just cause are almost always mediated by inanimate objects such that
targeting the object is sufficient to protect the life under threat. Therefore, property destruction is
almost always present as a preferable alternative to targeting persons, so targeting persons will
almost never pass the necessity condition.
I used ‘almost’ a lot in the last paragraph because I admit that, however unlikely, it’s
conceptually possible that targeting a person may be interpreted as necessary. For instance, it’s
possible that a person could wantonly wring the necks of the last pair of some species, so that just
cause is triggered without property mediating the attack. There are two points to raise here. First,
even if targeting a person is necessary in this rare sort of case, this will not countenance targeting
them for killing since killing will not pass the proportionality condition. Second, even if the
targeting of a person is necessary, restraint or other lesser harms than killing are likely to be
available first. Hence, there are perhaps some conceptually possible yet unrealistic scenarios
where we can imagine that targeting a person would pass the necessity condition, but the killing
of a person is so far from the reality of real-world defensive activism that it’s a hair’s breadth
from being conceptually ruled out. Moreover, democracy and proportionality provide individually
sufficient reasons to rule out targeting, seriously injuring, or killing persons.
Do SSCS and Reznicek and Montoya pass the requirement to not target, injure, or kill
persons? Paul Watson, of Sea Shepherd, often claims that they have ‘never caused a single injury
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to a single person’ and he has called their approach ‘aggressive non-violence.’137 While they have
never killed anyone, there are reports of Sea Shepherd causing minor injuries, and some attacks
can be interpreted as unacceptably risky, however, it’s clear that they go out of their way to avoid
endangering persons. Reznicek and Montoya never killed or hurt anyone, and while it could be
argued that their arson attacks put emergency services at risk, their statement reiterates their
commitment to ‘peaceful, nonviolent direct action’ and they see themselves as acting in the
tradition of the pacifist Catholic Worker’s Movement.138
In sum, permissible eco-sabotage as defensive activism ought to be done with just cause,
proportionality, necessity, and without targeting persons. Finally, a case can be made for both
SSCS and Reznicek and Montoya’s actions passing these conditions.

3.3: Objections

3.3.1: Democratic Objection

If someone is impermissibly endangering life, then it is permissible to sabotage their efforts.
Some may complain that this is objectionably coercive. Moreover, many acts that provide just
cause, and so impermissibly endanger life, are legally permissible. We can interpret these acts as
being democratically sanctioned in the sense that they’ve passed through impartial means of
137
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dispute resolution that respects everyone equally. If one ignores democratically mandated laws,
then it may be objected that one forcibly imposes one’s personal moral view upon the rest of
society. Living in a democratic society requires participants to respect views that they disagree
with and to honor the results of impartial processes that aim to fairly resolve disputes noncoercively. In a democratic state, individuals ought not bypass impartial means to resolve moral
disagreement by illegally and violently stopping an individual or group from achieving their
legally permissible goal.139
I’m sympathetic to this objection. The key issue is whether the value that grounds the
eco-saboteur’s act is one that others may not value. For instance, when basic human rights are
violated, it is no defense to point to how those basic rights violations were democratically
mandated. Defending basic rights may involve coercing others through property destruction, but
this is permissible, if not required, by appeal to a value it is impermissible to reject. Eco-sabotage
is impermissible if its justification depends upon one’s idiosyncratic moral view.140 Permissible
eco-sabotage must go beyond one’s personal moral view and appeal to society’s own moral
standards.141 Are any of the four just causes impermissible to reject in this way?
First, just cause as defense of rights. Despite being the most superficially similar to basic
human rights, I contend that a rights-based view is the most vulnerable to the charge of being
objectionably coercive. If we take our practices as evidence of our values, then it’s clear that there
is substantive disagreement over whether animals have, e.g., a right to life.
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Detractors may claim that this props up an extreme moral relativism. This
misunderstands the moral relevance of disagreement in this case, however. The moral value of
basic human rights is undeniable; animal rights are in a different position. Not because of mere
capitulation to the majority position, but because of the sorts of grounds one can appeal to when
justifying violence and serious rights violations. A case can be made to persuade others to the
cause of animal rights, but people may disagree. For violent, extra-judicial activism, we should
seek universal grounds.
Second, eco-sabotage as defense against extinction. On the one hand, large quantities of
resources are spent on saving species from extinction and campaigning has long been done on the
grounds of stopping extinction. On the other hand, dozens of species go extinct every day and one
million species face extinction, so extinction seems like regrettable but accepted background
noise. If avoiding extinction is particularly valuable, then people have a strange way of showing
it. The prevalence of extinction is a sad fact, but I don’t think this necessarily points to some deep
disagreement over whether extinction is something to be accepted or avoided. Instead, people’s
willingness to drive species to extinction is evidence of how easily overridden the presumption
against extinction is for some. Pursuit of their livelihood, for instance, can be enough, especially
when the species threatened is ‘just’ a plant, is seen as a pest or threat, or lacks aesthetic majesty.
Still, extinction is permanent and has unpredictable repercussions. If we are to choose to pursue
some development that will likely lead to the extinction of some species, I submit that a case
always needs to be made why pursuing this development is worth it. The choice to make extinct
always needs explanation and if this explanation is wanting, then the high stakes of the situation
can provide broadly held reasons to engage in defensive activism.
Third, eco-sabotage as defense against suffering is on firmer ground. There are already
all manner of laws protecting animals against suffering and campaigns to end various practices
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that cause suffering have been successful. Moreover, there are examples of eco-sabotage aimed at
ending animal suffering that have enjoyed widespread support. When the ALF broke into the
University of Pennsylvania’s Head Injury Lab, they not only caused millions of dollars’ worth of
damage, but they also exposed the unjustifiable suffering of baboons which lead to public outcry
and the end of the experiment.
Fourth, of the just causes surveyed, defense against climate change is the one that is most
uncontroversial as part of a universally held morality. This is because the value of basic human
rights is undeniable and climate change undermines the basic human rights of current and future
generations.142 The non-anthropocentric case can be made for why climate change is bad, but the
current objection asks whether the value that grounds a violent intervention is one that others in
society may be coerced to protect. Insofar as there is a causal connection between the release of
greenhouse gases, say, and the death and suffering of people, then the eco-saboteur has a strong
case for resorting to property destruction in their protection.
Hence, moving from most open to denial to most difficult to deny, the values that ground
just cause are animal rights, defense against extinction, defense against suffering, and defense
against climate change. Even after accepting the force of this objection, however, there is still
firm ground for permissible eco-sabotage, particularly if it is grounded in defense against climate
change, or defense against suffering. Admittedly the case gets more difficult to defend when
considering defense against extinction and I think it becomes unjustifiably coercive when based
on animal rights.
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3.3.2: Futility Objection

In the previous section, I argued that the easiest route to justified eco-sabotage is as defense
against climate change. Defense against climate change, however, is especially vulnerable to the
futility objection. Justified defensive acts provide permissible exceptions to moral and legal
restrictions partly because they are required to preserve something of considerable value. For this
reason, a further requirement of engaging in defensive actions is that they have a reasonable
chance of success. In just war, for instance, one may have just cause to go to war, and going to
war would pass conditions of jus ad bellum proportionality and necessity, but if the aggressor has
vastly superior weaponry, such that sending one’s soldiers to fight would simply be to send them
to slaughter, then one ought to refrain from doing so.
Which acts of eco-sabotage are likely to have a reasonable chance of success? Defense of
rights and defense against suffering seem straightforward since both refer to the value of
individuals. It is easy to judge whether one’s action will actually save the life or stop the suffering
of an animal, for instance. It’s less clear, however, whether defending one individual will do
much to protect a species, and the situation is much worse when it comes to defense against
climate change. In the scheme of things, does the temporary destruction of part of an oil pipeline,
e.g., do anything to preserve the value under threat?
A key issue here is how the value being defended is understood. I will illustrate with
three examples. First, if defense hangs on stopping climate change, we get the problem just
canvassed. Second, instead of taking climate change writ large as the impermissible event that
must be stopped, we may consider the egregious GHG emissions that the pipeline emits instead.
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This would obviously get the result that the destruction of the pipeline is necessary to achieve this
result. The difficulty, of course, is to explain why the level of GHG emitted by the pipeline is
impermissible. One way to do this would be to link it to climate change by calculating what some
population’s fair share of permissible emissions are and then showing that the pipeline’s
emissions are way beyond any reasonable amount. Another way to do this would be to connect
the level of GHGs that comes from the operating pipeline to actual harms in current or future
persons. Both routes are promising but face significant controversy. Third, the problem arises
when we consider the causal efficacy of isolated acts. It should be no surprise that individual acts
face causal efficacy worries in combatting a problem on the scale of climate change. It’s unclear,
however, why individual acts must defend the value at stake on their own. It’s undeniable that
tackling climate change will require long term strategizing and coordinating large groups of
people. Perhaps individual acts can be defended as a necessary component of a promising longterm strategy. This could increase the causal importance of the act of sabotage.
Did Reznicek and Montoya’s sabotage have a reasonable chance of success? As
mentioned, we can estimate the damages they caused at around $6 million. According to Stop
Fossil Fuels ‘That’s less than one sixth of one percent of the $3.78 billion pipeline budget—
amounting to a rounding error, and likely reimbursed by insurance.’143 Understood differently,
however, they delayed pipeline completion by around two months, roughly the same delay that
the entire #NoDAPL campaign achieved with thousands of people. By Stop Fossil Fuels’
calculations, Reznicek and Montoya stopped 30 million barrels with 10 ‘person months’ of effort
and around $3000.144 If hindering the transport of 30 million barrels of oil can be linked to saving
lives and preventing suffering, then their action was justified. It seems plausible that this
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conditional can be defended; however, for the sake of argument, let’s say that it’s insufficient.
Could pipeline sabotage be embedded in a broader strategy? The Valve Turners provide a
compelling case.
In 2016, in a coordinated attack over 4 states, 5 activists from Climate Direct Action
forcibly accessed and turned the emergency shut-off valves on four pipelines that carry oil into
the U.S from Canada. This involved accessing the fenced off emergency shut-off valves, using
bolt-cutters to unlock the valves, warning the pipe operators that they were about to shut them off,
and then turning the valve to shut off the oil. It’s reported that this stops the flow of up to 2.8
million barrels of oil a day.145 According to Stop Fossil Fuels, relative to the #NoDAPL
campaign, the Valve Turners were a much more efficient use of people and time, but nowhere
near as efficient as Reznicek and Montoya. One thing that sets the Valve Turners’ action apart,
however, is their plan to use the necessity defense in court.
Defendants may use the necessity defense to excuse themselves from criminal charges on
the grounds that the illegal action prevented a greater harm from occurring. The defense was used
in the UK in 2008 by the ‘Kingsnorth six’ a group of activists that caused criminal damage to the
Kingsnorth coal power station. They successfully argued that the continued use of coal power
would cause greater damage to property around the world.146
Of the four Valve Turner cases, only the one in Minnesota was granted permission to use
the necessity defense. The State prosecutor appealed, and in July 2018 the Minnesota Supreme
Court ruled in the Valve Turner’s favor. Their legal representation, the Civil Liberties Defense
Center (CLDC), claim this created a ‘state-wide binding precedent regarding the standards that
145

Nia Williams, ‘Activists Disrupt Key Canada-U.S. Oil Pipelines’, Reuters, 11 October 2016, sec.
Commodities, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-canada-pipelines-idUSKCN12B26O.
146
Others have attempted to establish this precedent in the U.S. E.g., Tim DeChristopher, the ‘Lobster Boat
Blockade’, the ‘Delta 5’, and Karenna Gore.

87

must be applied when an activist asserts the necessity defense.’147 In October 2018, however, the
trial judge acquitted the defendant, so the CLDC were never able to mount the necessity defense.
It’s worth noting that the Valve Turners did not destroy property (apart from chains that
secured the valves) to achieve their goals. Effective eco-sabotage need not involve property
destruction. However, it does show how eco-sabotage that involves property destruction could fit
into a broader and more effective environmental strategy because similar delays and costs could
be accrued to a pipeline operator using property destruction. The most materially costly actions,
and the most effective in environmental defense, need not involve property destruction, so this
makes it even more unclear why property would be viewed as sacrosanct when considering the
moral permissibility of defensive activism.148 If both property damage and a lack of property
damage result in similar material outcomes, then why consider property damage as so much
worse?

Hence, we may think that individual acts of eco-sabotage are futile in stopping
climate change. We may even hold (the somewhat extreme view) that individual acts that
stop significant GHG release are not causally effective in preserving life, preventing
suffering, or avoiding extinction. However, it seems to me that we cannot deny that some
acts of eco-sabotage are necessary components of a broader strategy of environmental
preservation. To deny the possibility of the effectiveness of a broader strategy is simply
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to deny the possibility of having any effect on climate change whatsoever. Some hold this
level of pessimism, but not only is it far from clear that all action on the climate is futile,
but this is hardly an objection specific to eco-sabotage as a morally justifiable approach.

3.4: Conclusion

My aim has been to develop a just war inspired defensive theory that justifies defensive activism
even in the face of some negative outcomes for the environmental movement. I also hope to have
shown how defensive theories need not lead to rationalizing murder or serious harm to persons.
The conscientious defensive activist can only engage in permissible eco-sabotage when she acts
with just cause as constrained by necessity, proportionality, with a reasonable chance of success,
and without putting life at excessive risk. Permissible eco-sabotage must pass stringent
conditions, but this is preferable to being unavailable as a strategy. Extreme situations call for the
availability of extreme tactics lest activists be left impotent in the face of egregious wrongs.
This places a considerable burden on eco-saboteurs to justify their acts. This is a burden
they ought to bear since all acts of eco-sabotage are illegal, so there’s a sense in which they all
bypass impartial means of conflict resolution. Appropriately constrained eco-sabotage doesn’t
bypass societal norms, however, but takes them to account. I’ve argued that this makes ecosabotage based on defense of animal rights unjustified. Species defense is justifiable but doesn’t
have as strong a case as defense against suffering or defense against climate change.
Finally, eco-sabotage must also have a reasonable chance of success since futile defense
is no defense at all. This objection has little effect on eco-sabotage as defense of rights or defense
89

against suffering because they are both about protecting individuals. Species defense and defense
against climate change, however, are more complicated to defend. I’ve argued that the strength of
this objection is reduced by placing the act of eco-sabotage in a broader environmental strategy.
Because defense against suffering doesn’t face the full brunt of either objection, it is
perhaps the most justifiable form of eco-sabotage. However, defense against climate change, and
to a lesser extent species defense, remain in the conscientious activist’s repertoire of permissible
actions.
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APPENDIX
While each of these papers can be read independently, I will finish by pointing toward
some of the broader themes and the direction of future work. Each paper argues for, or
takes as given, that the ultimate unit of moral consideration is the individual. While
individual autonomy is connected to collective self-determination, and this provides some
basis for legal and moral protections on the global stage, this cannot provide the basis for
prioritizing individual autonomy above all else. At minimum, we must ensure that the
basic rights of all are protected irrespective of location, and this requires a substantial
commitment to global institution building and reform. The institutions of global
governance are subject to regulatory capture and while this is probably unavoidable, it
can be mitigated. Attending to basic rights provides the focus for what the immediate
aims of global institutional reform ought to be. We ought to form global institutions to
serve the basic needs of everyone, and as individuals we ought to use all democratic and
legal means to achieve this aim. When the institutions egregiously work against this aim,
however, then we need not feel restricted by an extreme form of pacifism. Sometimes
upholding or establishing just institutions permits violently coercive acts.
The first paper gestures toward an account of the value of democracy on the
grounds that it preserves a means for everyone to meaningfully complain or work for
change. The second paper highlights a project of assessing the institutions of global
governance by the standard of basic rights provision. The third raises several questions
about the limits of democratic action and the justification of activism. What can be said
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of the health of a democratic process that leads to laws that sanction environmentally
destructive acts? Can a climate necessity defense be legally and/or morally justified? Can
the radical arm of a political movement be justified by making the less radical arm seem
more attractive? What other sorts of justification are available? These papers, I hope,
provide a starting point to address these questions.
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